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I. Introduction; Corporate Governance and Growth 
Corporate governance (CG) is related with the structures and processes for the direction 
and control of companies. Definitions vary but a key aspect of CG is ensuring the flow of 
external capital to firms. From the perspective of finance, “CG deals with the ways in 
which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investments.1” 
Country factors such as the quality of laws, the depth and liquidity of securities markets, 
the quality of banking system, the level of enforcement, disclosure infrastructure and 
culture play a determining role in setting the environment for corporate governance 
quality at the firm level. Lower the local standards, higher would be the costs of adopting 
better governance practices for individual firms. For example issuing IFRS based 
financial reports would be much costlier for a firm, if the local standards are inferior. 
Similarly, although the most important benefit from having good governance is that it 
facilitates access to capital markets, this would be worthless if the firm is located in a 
country with poor financial development.2 On the other hand the potential for financial 
sector to maximize the opportunities for growth is dependent upon the way corporations 
are governed. CG and financial development are interrelated.  
CG mechanisms in developing countries primarily depend on large block holders, bank 
monitoring (depending on health of banking system), reputation and self enforcement 
rather than market control and law enforcement. Concentrated ownership largely solves 
the free rider problems but it is associated with entrenchment of the owner/managers, 
higher risk exposure and liquidity constrains. At the aggregate level, these lead to poor 
development of capital markets and impediment of growth.  
A less emphasized but equally important aspect of corporate governance is the effect of 
corporate governance on companies’ operating performance. The relation between CG 
and organizational performance is of fundamental importance.  In the Turkish context, 
this is closely linked to professionalization of family-run firms and separation of 
management and control roles. A strong CG system aligns managerial and 
shareholder/investor interests and incorporates checks and balances that lead to better 
decisions to maximize company value. Two interdependent institutional factors can 
determine how closely the shareholder/investor interests and managerial interest are 
aligned and how easily the shareholders can monitor the management; (i) ownership and 
control patterns and   (ii) the corporate governance structure as defined by the legal 
system.  As the protection offered to shareholders/investors improves, expropriation 
becomes more costly for controlling shareholders. This may increase the importance of 
cash flow benefits over the private benefits for the controlling shareholders and lead to 
professionalization of the firm and performance improvements. 
CG affects growth through a number of channels. The obvious one is the increased access 
to finance as a result of increased investor confidence via capital markets, leading to 
larger investments and employment. The second one is increased valuation of firms based 
on lower cost of capital leading also to growth and employment. The third channel is 
better operational performance through better use of resources and better management.  
                                                 
1 Shleifer and  Vishny (1997) 
2 The same applies to supporting legal and regulatory improvements and complying with the existing laws and 
regulations. 
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Better operational performance is also associated with better relations with all 
stakeholders3 contributing to the sustainability of businesses.  
CG matters both for portfolio investors and direct equity investors since valuable growth 
opportunities that can not be financed with internal funds and debt can potentially be 
financed by capital markets. Better governed firms attract better employees. Furthermore, 
better governance standards encourage fair play, promoting competitiveness, innovation 
and productivity.  
Empirical evidence shows that it is not the presence of laws but rather enforcement that 
helps explain the development of financial and securities markets. Regulatory 
enforcement plays a more vital role in emerging markets since market forces are weaker. 
Although empirical evidence for the relationship between observable CG characteristics 
and economic performance is not conclusive for developed countries due to the tightened 
legal and regulatory regime which followed corporate scandals, there is ample evidence 
for a positive and causal relationship between corporate governance quality and 
performance at firm level in developing countries4. Better governance is found to be 
positively and significantly related to firm valuation in Korea, Russia, Thailand and 
Indonesia. A recent study covering 51 largest and most liquid Turkish companies 
indicates that transparency of board structure and processes, as a proxy for better 
governance, is related to both better market and accounting performance5.  
This report aims to provide an assessment of Turkey’s corporate governance regime and 
practices with a view to identify key issues and obstacles to investments and growth. We  
will focus on two aspects of CG framework in Turkey; (i) legal and regulatory protection 
offered to outside investors against the abuse and expropriation by the controlling 
shareholders, (ii) managerial practices and behavior as they relate to ownership structures. 
These two factors together determine how the companies are directed and controlled in 
Turkey.  
II. Corporate Governance in Turkey, a summary  
The governance of Turkish companies is characterized by highly concentrated ownership 
and insider-dominated boards. From 1986 when trading started at the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange, the market was characterized by opportunistic IPOs and a high occurrence of 
market abuses (especially market manipulation and insider trading). Related lending and 
transfer pricing were common practices and were unregulated. Government bonds and 
treasury bills absorbed most of the available private capital; companies lacked strategic 
direction, focused on day to day operations and delayed investments that were necessary 
to achieve competitiveness if the market were freer. This environment created a culture of 
risk averseness and shaped the nature of managerial practices - which were typified by 
highly informal systems and a distrust of formal mechanisms. Concentrated ownership 
continued to be the dominant form of corporate governance6. Against this background 
boards continued to be highly ineffective as a governance mechanism.  
This grimy picture started to change from 2001 as the macroeconomic outlook improved. 
Firstly, the legal and regulatory framework was strengthened considerably – a process 
                                                 
3 Claessens (2003) 
4 Black, Jang and Kim( 2005), Brown and Caylor ( 2005), Gompers, Ishii and Metrick ( 2003) 
5 Aksu and Kosedag (2006) 
6 For a macroeconomic view on corporate governance see Ararat and Ugur (2003) 
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that still continues thanks to anchors such as IMF and EU. Secondly, enforcement has 
improved. Thirdly, increased interest from foreign portfolio investors and direct investors 
in Turkish companies has forced companies to put their house in order – a process which 
has proved to be much more difficult and protracted than changing the rules. 7  
Improvements to the legal and institutional framework for corporate governance were 
pioneered by the Capital Markets Board (CMB) in Turkey with upgrading of accounting, 
reporting and auditing standards in line with international standards, followed by issuance 
of Corporate Governance Guidelines (the Guidelines) in July 2003. As of 2004, listed 
companies are mandated to include a CG compliance statement in their annual reports. 
Moreover, IFRS became mandatory in 2005. These requirements improved the 
transparency of listed companies and shed light to governance issues in Turkey in 
general. At the same time, restructuring of the banking sector with a new legal and 
regulatory framework for financial institutions provided the stimulus for further 
improvements.  Returning back to their core business of banking under much stronger 
local and international supervision, banks started to play a significant role in monitoring 
companies. Limitations imposed upon related lending on one hand and decreasing interest 
rates for government loans on the other forced the banks to look into the small to medium 
size enterprises (SMEs) as a new customer segment. Banks continue to act as change 
agents by educating SMEs on the importance of reliable financial information.8 These 
reforms represent a spectacular progress in the Turkish corporate governance framework 
in a relatively short time. 
Summary of Issues: 
Against the above background with a positive trend for better standards, current  CG 
issues in Turkey can be related to the following aspects of the Turkish CG regime; 
• Concentrated ownership and economic power associated with complex and 
opaque control structures with still significant state stake in some industries,9 
• Uncontested power of controlling shareholders due to low floatation rates, limited 
institutional shareholding and weak equity culture,  
• Unclear separation of management and control roles, ineffective boards, weak 
firm level formal control systems  
• Market abuse (market manipulation,  insider trading) as a result of the above 
• Weaknesses in enforcement10 
Key issues underpinning the above aspects are:   
• Ownership and control  structures 
o Weak disclosure regulations on the transparency of ownership  
                                                 
7 For a discussion on the affect of macroeceonomic stability on corporate governance system and practices see 
Ugur and Ararat (2006) 
8 For example Akbank educated 5000 SME representatives on the  implications of BASELII on qualification of 
companies for receiving credits.  
9 For a discussion on comparative transperancy of Turkish corporations see S&P-CGFT (S&P-CGFT 2004 and 
2005) 
10 For sources of comparative data  see  Kaufmann, Kray and  Mastruzzi (2003)   
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o Lack of central company registrar  
o Weak risk management and internal audit practices 
o Poor reporting on connected lending, transfer pricing and related party 
transactions, and on identity of  insiders  
o Weak contractual status of  employees and professional managers  
o No disclosure requirements on privately entered share purchase 
agreements or shareholder agreements 
• Shareholders Rights 
o Inefficient judiciary (lack of private enforcement) 
o No role for shareholders in major asset transactions  
o Weaknesses in regulations related with preemptive rights and mandatory 
bidding  
o Legal barriers to shareholder activism 
o Wide use of privileged share classes and share groups 
o Lack of independent research  
• Transparency 
o Poor accounting  and reporting standards (except publicly owned 
companies and banks)  
o Weaknesses in financial reporting especially in relation to consolidation    
o Delays in disclosure of material events (which does not include 
consolidated entities)  
o  Limited audit capacity   
o Lack of credible non-financial information disclosure 
Recent and forthcoming improvements in the legal and regulatory framework have the 
potential to radically improve the quality of the CG regime in Turkey. These 
improvements will require different leadership skills and management capabilities than 
those prevalent during the pre-reform period.  There is however a number of less obvious 
challenges stemming from Turkey’s societal culture characterized by power distance and 
hierarchical control. Turkey’s efforts to institutionalize democratic principles and 
encourage civic involvement needs to reflect on the relationship between powerful 
owners and other stakeholders. Concentrated ownership, which may have been a response 
to weak ownership rights, may become a disabling legacy. 
III. Institutional Framework and Market Overview  
a. Statues 
La Porta et al (1998) show that French civil law countries are least protective of minority 
shareholders. Turkey is a country in the French tradition. One of the building blocks of 
Page 4 
Melsa Ararat, Hakan Orbay 
CG legislative framework, the Commercial Code (CC), was originally taken from French 
Commercial Code in 1850 and amended in 1926 and 1956 with provisions taken from 
German, Swiss and Italian law. The 1956 version, with its evidently eclectic nature, forms 
the basis of equity contract and provides the legal framework for incorporation, general 
assemblies, shareholder rights, definition of shares and bonds and their issuance11. The 
Capital Markets Law (CML) had provisions taken from the Anglo-Saxon (common law) 
legal system but still has its roots in civil law. It primarily provides the legislative 
framework for securities market activities and establishes the CMB. Separate laws 
regulate the banking and insurance sectors. A major issue of legislation is related with the 
ambiguities in law and inconsistencies between CC and CML.  
The legal and regulatory framework governing Turkish firms comprise the following: 
Laws; 
• Commercial Code 6762 (1956),  
• Capital Markets Law 2499 (1981) – major amendments by Law 3794 (1992) and 
Law 4487 (1999) 
• Decree-law No.91 (1984) - regulates establishment and activities of the stock 
market  
• Decree- No.32 (1989) – provides for equal treatment of foreign investors 
• Banking Law 5411 (2005) 
• Banks Act 4389 (1999)  
• Competition Law 4054 (1994) 
• Bankruptcy  Law 2004 (1932) 
• Code of Obligations 818 (1926) 
• Tax Procedural Law (1950) 
• Law of Independent Accountants and Sworn in Financial Advisors 3568 (1989)   
 
CG related regulations; 
• CMB’s Regulations and Communiqués related with  
o Capital Market Instruments (Common Stocks, Bonds, Participative 
Dividend Shares, Profit and Loss Sharing Certificates, Bank Bills and 
Bank Guaranteed Bills, Commercial Papers, Gold, Silver and Platinum 
Bonds, Asset Backed Securities, Real Estate Certificates and Foreign 
Capital Markets Instruments)   
o Capital Market Institutions (Intermediaries, Investment Trusts, Venture 
Capital Investment Trusts, Real Estate Investment Trusts, Mutual Funds 
and Rating Agencies),  
o Exchanges ( Stock Exchange, Precious Metal Exchanges, Derivative 
Exchanges) 
o Corporate Governance Principles  
• BRRS’s Regulations and Communiqués 
o Regulation on Accounting and Reporting 
                                                 
11 Ararat and Ugur (2003) 
Page 5 
Melsa Ararat, Hakan Orbay 
o Regulation on Procedures and Policies of Independent Audit  
o Regulation on Bank’s Internal Control and Risk Management Systems 
 
The backbone of the legal framework, the Commercial Code (CC), borrowed from French 
company law in the 19th century, is outdated. It has crucial weaknesses, and is also 
inconsistent with both the more recent and Anglo-Saxon influenced Capital Markets Law 
(CML) and the new Banking Law. The Code of Obligations and Bankruptcy Laws are 
also outdated and in need of alignment with the Draft CC. 
Draft Laws and regulations awaiting approval; 
• Draft Commercial Code  
• Draft Law on Housing Finance-Mortgage  System (CMB)  
• Draft Capital Markets Law (CMB) 
• Draft Regulation on Independent Audit Standards (CMB) 
• Draft Financial Services Act (BRSA) 
• Draft Banks Act (BRSA) 
 
The Draft CC, which aims to align Turkish company law with the European Union 
directives and its CG Action Plan, is radical and comprehensive12. In general terms, the 
proposed amendments relating to joint stock companies are intended to: (a) eliminate a 
number of important differences in the regulation of closely held and publicly traded 
companies (especially with respect to financial reporting, transparency and the functions 
of boards and auditors); (b) provide more protection to minority shareholders and 
creditors, e.g. through new provisions relating to company groups; (c) bring Turkish 
company law into alignment with EU directives; and (d) facilitate the use of technology 
in company affairs (such as electronic shareholder meetings). Draft CML, which is 
currently in consultation, provides improvements to the enforcement framework for listed 
companies and introduces new instruments.  The draft narrows the scope of CML’s 
coverage by increasing the maximum  number of shareholders which a company remains 
as privately owned from 250 to 500, provides for regulated share buybacks, squeeze-outs 
of minorities following tender offers and rights for shareholders who vote against mergers 
to demand that their shares be purchased at a fair price. It also brings the laws on market 
abuse into alignment with EU directives and strengthens the provisions related with the 
accountability of the CMB by introducing independent annual audit of the CMB. Finally 
the Draft Regulation on Independent Audit Standards brings important and significant 
improvements to the audit framework for listed companies in compliance with the EU 
Company Law 8th Directive. The Draft Financial Services Act and Draft Banks Act also 
include significant provisions related with the governance of the credit lending 
institutions.  
Without the enactment of the draft laws and regulations listed above, the legal framework 
for corporate governance in Turkey will remain severely inadequate. 13 IIF’s recent 
report14 on CG in Turkey presents a detailed review of Turkish statues against widely 
accepted CG principles and best practices required by the investment community, to 
                                                 
12 For a detailed discussion see Ugur and Ararat (2006)  
13 For a detailed discussion see Ararat and Ugur (2003) and EU’s accession report, Nov.2005 
14 IIF(2005) 
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conclude that without the effective enforcement of CMB’s CG Principles and enactment 
of Draft Commercial Code, Turkey falls behind the minimum standards.  
An important anchor for Turkish CG framework is the EU directives and 
recommendations, of which most relevant are the following; 
• Directive on Financial Conglomerates (2002/87/EC) 
• Directive on Credit Institutions (2000/12/EC) 
• Directive on Transparency Requirements (2004/109/EC) 
• Recommendation on Directors Remuneration (2004/913/EC) 
• Recommendation on Independent Directors (2005/162/EC) 
• Draft Directive on Board Responsibility and Improvement of Financial 
Information (COM (2004) 725) 
• EU Regulation 1606/2002/EC on IFRS ( CMB’s Communiqué XI-25 provides 
compliance)   
• Directive on Prospectuses (2003/71/EC) and Insider Dealing (2003/6/EC)   
• 4th Company Law Directive on Annual Accounts ( 78/660/EEC ) 
• 7th Company Law Directive on Consolidated Accounts (83/349/EEC) 
• 8th Company Law Directive  on Independent Audit (CMB Communiqué X-22 
partially meets the criteria)  
 
Company law Acquis15 includes rules on the company law, accounting and auditing. In 
the area of financial reporting, the acquis specifies rules for the presentation of annual 
and consolidated accounts, including simplified rules for SMEs. The application of IAS is 
mandatory for some public interest entities. In addition, acquis specifies rules for the 
approval, professional integrity and independence of statutory audits. The latest accession 
report on Turkey dated November 2005 notes limited progress in the field of company 
law, in adoption of IFRS and IAS and in auditing, specifically referring to delays in 
establishing Accounting Standards Board (ASB) as a separate body with an improved 
regulatory framework. It suggests that the regulatory framework needs to be extensively 
redefined as regards the scope and the type of responsibilities of independent auditors. 
Lack of central company register and unavailability of financial information 
electronically are other shortcomings noted by the report. 
Draft CC would cover most of the requirements of the 4th and 7th Directives. Draft 
Regulation on Audit Standards is expected to meet the requirements of the 8th Directive 
for listed companies. Recommendations on Directors Remuneration and Independent 
Directors are somewhat addressed by the CMB’s CG Principles but compliance is only 
voluntary. Directive on Transparency is partially met with the current CML and the 
Guidelines.   Draft Banks (Credit Providers) Act and Financial Services (Banking) Act 
cover EU Directives 2000/12/EC (credit institutions) and 2002/87/EC (financial 
conglomerates). They introduce significant improvements to the ownership, control and 
governance of financial institutions, however they have been heavily criticized by various 
constituencies and they are not expected to be enacted soon.  
                                                 
15 The acquis includes all primary legislation (treaties), secondary legislation (regulations, Directives, Decisions, 
Recommendations, etc.) and case law.  
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The draft Banking Act sets the ground for dissolving the financial and industrial arms of 
family owned conglomerates by ensuing reduction in connected lending and limiting 
shareholding of banks in non-financial institution to a maximum of 15% of its own funds 
from the current level of 20% .  The draft gives ample powers to Banking Regulatory and 
Supervisory Agency and holds the board and senior managers liable, jointly and 
severally, for the repayment of credits extended in violation of the act. In addition to 
general technical requirements for prudent banking (in  areas such as accounting, risk 
management, internal control, bad loan provisions, capital adequacy, elimination of full 
state guarantee on deposits, etc.) the draft Banking Law provides for alignment with  
international best practices and sets strict criteria concerning the personal integrity of 
general managers, assistant general manages and board members. It authorises BRSA to 
issue mandatory Corporate Governance Rules which includes a strong component of 
independence in the Board assured by statutory approval of independent member 
nominations. 
 
CMB has initiated a twinning project in December 2005 with the objective of completing 
the alignment of the capital markets legislation and its proper implementation in 
accordance with the EU Acquis Communautaire. A twinning contract has been signed 
with the German Federal Ministry of Finance. The project has started in December 2005 
and is expected to be completed in November 2007. The project is a demonstration of 
CMB’s commitment to harmonize the legal and regulatory framework with that of EU at 
the same pace with member states. German law recognizes group structures; we believe 
this will also contribute to effective implementation of EU directives within the Turkish 
context where business groups are dominant.   
  
 In the remaining parts of this report we will indicate the deficiencies of the legal system 
in effect and comment on where the drafts will provide an adequate improvement.  
b. Institutions 
Key institutions with statutory powers and/or responsibilities related with corporate 
governance are the following:  
• Banking Regulations and Supervisory Agency (BRSA), established in 2001(?)  
• Capital Markets Board (CMB), established in 1982  
• Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE), established in 1985 
• Competition Authority (CA), established in 1997 
• Accounting Standards Board (TMSK), established in 1999   
• Chambers of Independent Accountants and Certified Public Accountants, and 
Sworn-in Certified Public Accountants ( together forms the union;  TURMOB), 
established in 198916 
 
The BRSA is the principle competent authority for banks whereas the general directorate 
for insurance of the Undersecretariat of Treasury is the principle competent authority for 
insurance companies. The BRSA establishes the financial reporting standards of the 
companies they regulate, monitor the compliance with the standards, set audit standards 
for external audit, authorize and monitor the conduct of external audits and set sector 
                                                 
16 www.turmob.org.tr, TURMOB has  60679 registered accountants and 3474 financial advisors 
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specific prudentially oriented standards. Publicly owned banks are subject to CML related 
with their securities market activities and hence they are also required to issue CG 
compliance report.     
The CMB develops, regulates and supervises Turkey’s securities markets under the 
authority of a State Ministry in charge. It drafts statutory laws to be submitted to 
parliament for approval and issues communiqués (rules)   and regulations. These rules are 
published in the official gazette after receiving clearance from the related Ministry. The 
CMB develops corporate governance standards for publicly held companies and 
determines the ISE’s listing standards. It has extensive supervisory powers. It is 
authorized to suspend trading, stop public offerings, change time limits for subscription 
periods, as for special reports and disclosure, require purchasing of minority shares at 
market prices, ask for remedial measures if company’s financial health is in trouble ask 
for liquidation of financial intermediaries and take the cases of violation to the public 
prosecutors. CMB approval is required for a wide range of fundamental changes. CMB 
staff monitor publicly held companies’ disclosures and can attend shareholder meetings 
as observers. The CMB sets financial reporting and independent auditing standards for 
most publicly held companies and capital markets institutions (except banks and 
insurance companies) and licenses and supervises the auditors of most publicly held 
companies, market intermediaries and rating agencies. It has wide investigation powers. 
Its Executive Board can also exercise certain enforcement powers, such as: (a) order or 
cause the disclosure of information; (b) ban certain persons from participating in 
organized capital markets if the Executive Board finds that they have committed certain 
financial crimes; (c) refer suspected financial crimes such as insider dealing to the Public 
Prosecutor; and (e) impose administrative pecuniary penalties for certain breaches of 
capital markets laws. The members of the board are appointed by the Cabinet for a 6 
years term. 
ISE’s status is rather complicated; it is financially independent but closely supervised by 
the CMB. It is governed by an Executive Council elected by the General Assembly 
composed of its members for a term of four year whereas the chairman is appointed by 
the government for a term of five years. Its revenues are generated from fees charged on 
transactions, listing procedures and miscellaneous services. The profits of the ISE are 
retained to meet expenses and to undertake investments, and are not distributed to any 
third parties. The ISE has its own budget, but its costs and expenses have been strictly 
monitored by the ministry through the CMB. For example limits are imposed upon the 
salaries and expenses. ISE members are incorporated banks and brokerage houses 
authorized by the CMB.  
A key issue with the enforcement of laws and regulations in force is the inconsistencies 
and lack of coordination in between, and clarity about, the authorities of CMB, BRSA, 
and Ministries of Finance (oversees CML)  and  Trade and Industry (oversees CC). The 
draft CC resolves some of problems by establishing the legal authority of the CMB on 
corporate governance issues and requires all other regulatory agencies to consult and seek 
approval for any sector specific provisions. 
Additionally, there are voluntary professional associations with no statutory rights. Their 
legitimacy depends on their international affiliations which are no longer subject to 
government permission thanks to the new Associations Act. The most relevant 
professional organizations are as follows: 
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• Institute of Internal Audit (TIDE), established in 1994.17 
TIDE is granted the National Institute Status by Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) 
and is a member of European Confederation of Institute of Internal Auditors 
(ECIIA), has a regular publication of high quality content and is authorized to 
conduct Certified Internal Auditor (CIA) and CCSA, CFSA and CGAP exams 
since 2000. TIDE currently has 642 members. So far, 122 professionals have been 
awarded CIA status. 
• Risk Management Professionals Association (RYD), established in 200218 
RYD is young and has only 162 members, mostly from banks. It is affiliated with 
Global Association of Risk Professionals (GARP). 
• Turkish Institutional Investment Managers’ Association (KYD), established in 
199919 
• Turkish Shareholders  Association (BORYAD)20 
BORYAD brings together the individual investors and has recently become a 
member of Euroshareholders.  
Other institutions that play a role as opinion leaders are 
• Corporate Governance Association (TKYD) which brings together executives 
interested in corporate governance issues has approximately 246 members21   
• TUSIAD’s corporate governance task force, consisting of voluntary individuals 
from member companies  
• Sabanci University’s corporate governance research and advocacy center; 
Corporate Governance Forum of Turkey (CGFT)22  
 
Currently there are two corporate governance rating agencies registered with the CMB;   
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Core Ratings and one boutique consulting 
firm dedicated to offer corporate governance consulting services. The rating agencies 
offer corporate governance rating services in Turkey by bringing in analysts from their 
European offices subject to CMB’s regulatory supervision. The only locally established 
credit rating agency is Fitch Ratings. So far only two companies have disclosed a 
corporate governance rating score. 
c. Enforcement regime 
In the absence of class actions and derivative actions, and insufficient use judicial system 
by private persons in general, the role CMB plays becomes very important Throughout 
the 1990s, there were severe operational problems with the legal process and law 
enforcement in Turkey. First of all, ministers and members of parliament enjoyed 
extensive immunity against corrupt practices, which included permissive supervision, 
lenient law enforcement and distribution of rents in return for political support. Secondly, 
the process was complicated, slow and costly; or it was unpredictable due to heavy 
reliance on decrees. Thirdly, the general inefficiency of the legal process and the 
weaknesses in law enforcement compromised the institutions that were introduced to 
                                                 
17 www.tide.org.tr
18 www.ryd.org.tr  
19 www.kyd.org.tr
20 www.boryad.org
21 www.tkyd.org
22 www.cgft.sabanciuniv.edu
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supervise listed corporations. After 2001, a number of instruments were introduced to 
strengthen the enforcement such as the New Civil Code and Civil Procedure Code (2002), 
New Panel Code and Panel Procedure Code (2002) to improve the judicial independence, 
law on Justice Academy (2003) to improve court efficiency. 
Since 2000, the CMB has filed complaints to the office of public prosecutors for around 
100 violations of Capital Market Law (CML) every year. As shown in Table 1, only one 
case in each year has reached decree absolute, with the rest resulting in dismissals and 
adjournments. The average time between the CMB’s appeal and the first verdict 
(excluding decisions on adjournment and dismissal) was more than 12 months. The 
public prosecutor had not reacted to files concerning 26 cases in 2001 and half of the 
cases in 2002. The result is that only 1 % of all complaints ended up with any 
punishment.  
 
Table 1: Cases commenced after application of the CMB to the public prosecutor 
Distribution by topic Judging Stage 
Year 
Number of 
Applications 
Insider 
Trading Manipulation Others Investigation Pending Adjudicated*
2002 124 1 78 45 41 40 43 
2003 158 1 93 64 67 84 7 
2004 124 2 77 45 78 46 0 
Source: CMB Annual Report, page 75 
* Out of 50 cases in 2002-2003, only one case resulted in condemnation (2%), 39 was 
suspended and 4 was dismissed  
                        
In Turkey, violation of CML is not sufficient for prosecution, which takes place only after 
application by the CMB. Therefore, it is important that the regulator has the means and 
capacity for market surveillance. The CMB has invested considerably in renewing its 
information system and technical infrastructure in recent years. The new system which 
provides for a real time monitoring of the market, has capabilities to give early warnings 
about abnormal security trades. It also incorporates Public Key Infrastructure technology 
which allows usage of digital certificates and digital signatures for timely electronic 
disclosure of financial and non-financial information via a secure computer network. By 
the end of the project, the Capital Market Board will have established a secure 
communication and data transfer infrastructure between itself and all relevant companies, 
intermediaries and other institutions The CMB took further measures to encourage 
investors play a monitoring role by establishing a task force within CMB with the 
mandate to respond and act upon investors’ request for information. In 2003 and 2004, 
5859 request for information was submitted to the CMB and 97.20% of these were 
concluded.  
Private enforcement is considered to be the most powerful enforcement, but rarely used 
by minority shareholders in Turkey. Shareholder activism is minimal and associated with 
international institutional investors. While the percentage of international institutional 
investors’ shares in publicly traded equities increased from around 40% to around 80% in 
the recent years, average value of shares held in a single company by an institutional 
shareholder is small to justify any cost of monitoring. Individual investors (day traders) 
hold majority of the locally held shares. Anecdotal evidence suggest that hedge funds are 
Page 11 
Melsa Ararat, Hakan Orbay 
the most active shareholders, requesting information, filing complaints with the CMB and 
so on. Although pension funds are rapidly growing, they are still fairly small and their 
portfolio choices are limited due to the shallow nature of the market. Some market 
participants argue that the portfolio choices are biased as most funds of the funds are 
managed by the investment management companies associated with business groups and 
cross investments are common between companies that are in friendly terms. CMB 
reports that the only significant use of legal system with respect to shareholders rights 
were related with companies which failed to implement the mandatory cumulative voting 
directive for unlisted firms with more than 500 shareholders. In a survey conducted in 
2003 among 1292  investors  to identify the training and education needs, 60% of the 
sample stated that their knowledge about shareholders rights were less than satisfactory; 
71% never read the prospectuses whereas only 38% regularly reads the disclosures of 
material events. 28% of the sample never read the financial statements. 49% of the 
investors in the sample stated that they don’t need to be educated about their rights since 
there is no enforcement.23
Modern capital markets of Turkey have been operational for only two decades now, 
although history of equity trading goes back to the turn of the century. Formation of 
capital markets was initiated by enactment of Capital Markets Law in 1981, and 
establishment of Capital Markets Board a year later. Following inauguration of Istanbul 
Stock Exchange (ISE) in 1985, equity trading commenced in 1986. Figure 1 shows the 
development of ISE equity market in terms of trading volume and market cap index.  
FIGURE 1 here 
Prior to 1990, trading was insignificant. Since 1990, ISE has shown a strong overall 
growth, but also very high volatility reflecting the period of economic turbulence. In the 
last 15 years, average annual return was 30% in US$, with a standard deviation of 60%. 
Volatility, however, displays a marked decreasing trend; while annual volatility was 
around 90% in the early years, it has declined to around 40% in recent years.24
Similar to other developing countries, ISE is an underdeveloped equity market. As of 
May 2006, market capitalization has reached $143 billion. This represents 30-35% of 
GDP, well below OECD average of 135%. Equity shares of 272 companies are traded, 
together with shares of 10 real-estate investment funds and 26 mutual funds. The list of 
public companies includes only one-fifth of the largest 500 companies. Foreign share in 
free float was around 60% by the end of 2005. There are roughly 1.2-1.3 million retail 
investors. 290 mutual funds have assets of USD 21.9 billion, 96 pension funds have assets 
of USD 836 million and 38 investment trusts have assets of USD 887 million. At the end 
of 2005, market capitalization of listed banks represented approximately 29% of the total 
market capitalization of the ISE and 23% of the total traded value.  
In addition to equity market, ISE is also the secondary market for government and 
corporate bonds, though there have been no corporate bond issues so far.  
A separate exchange for derivative securities, Turkish Derivatives Exchange (TurkDEX), 
was established in 2004. Currently, only the futures markets, including contracts on 
currency, stock market, government bonds and some commodities, are active. 
                                                 
23 Survey on the financial literacy of investors, TUSSIDE 
24 Standard deviation figures are estimated from monthly returns on ISE100 index. 
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Settlement service to both ISE and TurkDEX is provided by Takasbank, which is also the 
custodian bank for all traded securities. According to the CMB regulations, no institution 
other than Takasbank is permitted to store physical certificates of securities in Turkey. 
Corporate actions, such as dividend payments and rights issues, are also facilitated 
through Takasbank.  
As of May 2006, foreign investors held 65% of the equity value in ISE. Data is not 
available on the type of investors; nevertheless, it reasonable to assume that majority of 
foreign investors are institutional investors. On the domestic side, institutional investors 
have been weak, but gaining a higher share. Domestic institutional investors are mainly 
mutual funds formed by financial intermediaries; however, recently established pension 
funds are the fastest growing group of the institutional investors. Following the first 
establishment of pension funds in October 2003, total investment grew to 1.2 billion YTL 
(approximately €750 million) as of December 2005. 
FIGURE 2 here 
Individual pension system has highly been stimulated by tax incentives based on EET 
type regime where premiums are deducted, the fund itself is not taxed and withdrawals 
are taxed within certain limits. There are also other tax incentives such as exemption of 
stamp duties, etc. that reduce the costs. The pension system is regulated by 
Undersecretary of Treasury and Capital Markets Board of Turkey. The system is well 
designed as regards to the custody, disclosure, portfolio management, monitoring issues. 
The private pension system of Turkey is still in its infant stage. Additionally, the Pension 
Fund By-Law states that pension funds shall not pursue the aim of participating in the 
management of any of the company whose shares they have bought and shall not be 
represented in the management of such companies. The legal structure of the fund is 
defined as an asset established for investments to be made with contributions collected by 
the company pursuant to and under pension contracts and administered within the 
individual pension accounts on behalf of the participants, in accordance with principles of 
risk diversification and fiduciary ownership. Fund does not have a legal entity.  
IV. State of business organizations 
Literature on Turkish business organizations is almost entirely based on companies listed 
at ISE, as reliable data is not available for the corporate sector at large. A study by Boston 
Consulting Group (BCG)25 reports that there are around 35,000 joint stock companies in 
Turkey, making up 2% of all business entities. The figures vary since there is no central 
registry of companies in Turkey. The number of companies subject to CML (with more 
than 250 shareholders) is 637. In Turkey, joint stock is the only legal form for which a 
board is mandated; hence any corporate governance discussion will be limited to this 
form of business organization. 
The corporations are generally categorized as small to medium size. BCG study also 
indicates that the number of corporations employing more than 250 workers is less than 
2,000 – or approximately 5% of all corporations. Another 10% of these companies 
employ 100 to 250 workers. 
                                                 
25 Boston Consulting Group (2005), report published on Corporate Governance Association’s web site.  
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A good discussion of the business environment and post-crisis dynamics can be found in 
Lieberman and Yildirim26.  
a. Ownership and control structures  
Ownership structures of Turkish companies can be characterized as highly concentrated. 
Typically, a majority of shares are owned by a controlling block, which is owned by 
members of a family in most cases. Even for public companies, the fraction of floated 
shares is quite low. Figure 3 shows distribution of free float ratio for the 272 corporations 
traded on ISE. In this group, average flotation ratio is 35.7%. Weighted by market 
capitalization, this ratio drops to 30.5%, indicating that firms with higher market 
capitalization have somewhat lower flotation ratios.  The larger holdings are somewhat 
smaller and have more concentrated family ownership. Internationalization mostly takes 
the form of joint ventures or strategic partnerships with multinational firms. 
FIGURE 3 here 
In the initial public offering, the percentage of shares offered to the public can not be less 
than a specified percentage (25%, 15% and 5%) depending on the amount of capital of 
the company.  25% flotation is required for companies with capital more than 10 million 
YTL (app. €5 million), however there are companies with only 1% of the shares traded. 
There is no minimum offering rate for secondary offerings or minimum floatation rate 
after the initial public offering. Korea is an interesting example about the regulatory 
options that can be utilized in increasing the flotation rates.    
Special attention should be paid to two types of organization, Business Groups and State-
Owned Enterprises, as largest companies belong to one of these categories with few 
exceptions. 
Business groups 
Business Groups in Turkey are similar in character to those in other emerging countries, 
such as Korea, Mexico or India.27 Business Groups emerged through diversifying 
investments of individuals and families leading to subsequent family control. There are 
only two major groups that are not controlled by families: Is Bank and OYAK. Is Bank 
was founded by Ataturk in the early years of the republic and bequeathed to the political 
party (CHP) during the single party regime. CHP still owns part of Is Bank together with 
the pension fund of the bank employees. OYAK is a unique organization, established 
through a special law, which functions as the pension fund of military personnel. 
Except Is Bank and OYAK, these groups are organized around holding companies. Large 
groups have several subsidiaries listed, while central holding company may not be listed. 
Group affiliated companies dominate ISE. 13 holding companies and 8 affiliated banks 
account for 40% of the total market value of ISE. 
Groups generally operate in diverse business lines, and intend to remain as diversified 
conglomerates.28 Recently, several groups extended their operations overseas. Most 
groups have affiliated banks, and other financial subsidiaries. Group banks served to 
finance groups’ activities, and tied lending was significant until recent regulations. 
                                                 
26 Lieberman and Yildirim, section III. 
27 Lieberman and Yildirim, see VI.5 
28 Lieberman and Yildirim, see Box 4, Large Group Characteristics 
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Currently, tied lending does not seem to be a source of concern. In fact, recently many 
groups sold, entirely or partially, their banks to foreign groups as in-house financing lost 
its appeal. 
Business groups are likely to be very important for growth of Turkish economy in the 
near term, due to the fact that they represent a significant fraction of equity capital 
available for investment. An important concern is that, in general, groups shy from 
technology related investments and are weak in research and development. Technology 
needs have been generally addressed through licensing and local joint-ventures with 
multi-nationals. 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) 
At the time Turkey was founded in 1923, virtually no industrial production existed in the 
country. During these early years, with little private capital and entrepreneurial know-
how, the only means of establishing an industrial base was through investments by state. 
Consequently, SOEs were established in almost every basic industry. By 1985, when the 
first privatization program was initiated, most industries were dominated by SOEs (see 
LY). With the initial privatization program, many SOEs were converted into joint stock 
companies. However, privatization did not proceed smoothly. Despite the faster pace in 
recent years, there are still a large number of SOEs on the auction block. 
For detailed discussion of SOEs and privatization program, we refer the interested reader 
to Lieberman and Yildirim. 
Listed Companies29
In a study of listed companies, Yurtoglu30  reports that families control 80% of public 
companies with an average voting block of 67%. In half of these companies, majority 
owner is a holding company controlled by the family. For the remaining 20% of the 
companies, the majority block is again 67% on average, held by state or institutions 
without family control.  
Complex pyramidal structures are frequent, although there is a trend towards 
simplification of these pyramids. Through these structures, families maintain control with 
a much higher fraction of voting rights than cash-flow rights. For the family controlled 
companies, families claim, on average, 51% of cash flow rights compared to 67% of 
voting rights. For the median company, the ratio of voting rights to cash flow rights is 
1.12, though the mean is much higher (5.3). 
Despite concentrated ownership, there is a wide spread use of multiple class shares. 
Company articles of association may assign various types of privileges to different 
classes. According to CMB survey in 2004, %42 of public companies have share classes 
with a privilege of nominating board members, which is the most commonly used 
privilege. Other observed privileges are voting rights (21%) and nomination of statutory 
auditors (18%). As an example, Table 2 displays share classes in Adana Çimento, a 
cement company. Adana is a rare case where shares in all three classes are traded in ISE. 
Typically, shares in privileged classes are not floated. 
        
                                                 
29 Adopted from Isik and Orbay (2005). 
30 Yurtoglu (2000) 
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          Table 2. Share classes and privileges in Adana Cement 
 
 
Share 
Class 
Equity 
Capital 
Ratio 
Cash 
Flow 
Rights 
Voting 
Rights Other Privileges 
A 26% 54% 41% 
- Two votes per share 
- Nominates 4 of 7 board members 
- Nominates 2 of 3 audit committee members
B 25% 36% 20% - Nominates 1 of 7 board members 
C 49% 10% 39% - Nominates 2 of 7 board members 
 
b. Financing Patterns and Equity Financing 
A survey compiled by Central Bank of Turkey collected financial data from 6,667 
companies of various forms and sizes from 2002 to 2004. The following key indicators in 
Table 3 are calculated from aggregates of all companies. Of these companies 442 (6.6%) 
employed more than 500 workers, but represent 50% of total sales and 52% of total 
assets. Therefore, the results are biased towards ratios of these large firms. 
 
Table 3: Key indicators31 from aggregate financial statements of surveyed 
companies. 
 2002 2003 2004 
Financial Leverage 44% 37% 26% 
Debt/Assets 28% 24% 18% 
Times Interest Earned 1.83 3.26 3.47 
Trade Payables 
(% of total assets) 16% 15% 13% 
Return on Equity 9% 11% 8% 
Net Profit Margin 7% 6% 5% 
Sales Growth  30% 28% 
Net Income Growth  86% 26% 
Source: Compiled from reports published at the web site of Central Bank of Turkey. 
 
Other than equity, there are essentially two forms of financing available for companies: 
Bank debt and trade credit. Bank debt is typically short-term or subject to calling from the 
bank. Prior to recent years, long-term debt in the form of corporate bonds could not be 
considered due to very high real interest rates. Despite these limitations, debt constitutes 
18% of the balance sheet. Furthermore, it is evident that trade credit is a significant form 
                                                 
31 Financial leverage is the ratio of interest-bearing debt to sum of interest-bearing debt and equity, Debt/Assets 
is interest-bearing debt over total assets, and times interest earned is EBIT divided interest payments. 
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of financing for all firms. We suspect that trade credit dependence is more emphasized for 
small firms. It is also interesting to note that the corporate sector was highly leveraged 
and quite risky following the 2001 crisis. Over two years, leverage significantly declined 
and times interest earned (TIE) improved.  
World Business Environment Survey (WBES) 2000, published by IFC, reports that 47% 
of surveyed Turkish companies use internal funds to finance investments, whereas only 
8% use new equity capital from sale of stock. An interesting finding is that public 
offering of shares is observed more in medium sized companies (12.5%) than large 
companies (5.9%) by a significant margin. This is an interesting finding, indicating larger 
companies may be more concerned about dilution of ownership than financing growth 
through equity issues. The same is also observed in free-float ratios, i.e., larger firms on 
average floated a smaller fraction of shares which may be related with the lower 
minimum float rate set by the CMB for larger companies.  
Figure 4 shows the number of IPOs at ISE and total value of issued equity (including 
seasoned issues) over the years, together with average value of ISE100 index. Overall, the 
pattern clearly identifies timing as an important criterion for equity issue decision. Total 
equity issued follows the ISE index closely.32
FIGURE 4 here 
Isık and Orbay (2005) present evidence that ISE has not been a significant source of 
equity capital. To this end, they compute net equity flows to corporations listed in ISE by 
deducting cash dividends paid from total funds raised through IPOs, seasoned offerings 
and rights issues. Figure 5 depicts net equity flows over the years. As shown, net equity 
flow to companies from capital markets is disappointingly low. Even including the record 
2000 year, net equity flow to all ISE companies in the last 5 years was $677 million, 
including equity raised from privately held (non-floating) shares. Year 2004 is an 
interesting point. In general companies had record profits in 2004, and paid out more than 
twice the dividends paid in 2003. Yet, average payout ratio (excluding corporations 
showing a loss) was 10% compared to 20% in 2003. 
  
FIGURE 6 here 
 
V. Governance pillars 
a. Shareholders Rights 
Legal Framework 
The fundamental rights of shareholders are based on four principles in Turkish CC. The 
first and the key aspect of the Turkish CC is the primacy of the company (the interests of 
the company comes before the interests of the shareholders). The law was enacted when 
state owned organizations were dominant in the economy with an understanding that joint 
stock companies are legal persons with an economic purpose. The joint stock company 
                                                 
32 Year 1999 appears as an anomaly, but in fact it is not. Index jumped up 130% in the last two months of 1999, 
starting an IPO frenzy which actually materialized in 2000. 
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exercises her civil rights through her organs, namely the general assembly, the board, 
whose members must be shareholders, and the (statutory) audit committee33. With the 
direct representation of the shareholders in the board, the primacy of the company 
provides a solid basis for resolving conflicts of interests between controlling shareholders, 
(who tend to sit in the board), and the minorities. The primacy of company’s interest is so 
fundamental that the directors may be liable for their actions even when they simply 
implement the decisions of the general assembly that are not serving the interests of the 
company. The other three principles that the CC is based are; equality (in treatment of the 
shareholders), diligence and care (in implementing the decisions made at the general 
assembly), and the duty of loyalty (of the company) to the shareholders and other 
stakeholders (directors can not trade with the company). On the other hand, CMB’s CG 
Guidelines acknowledge the primacy of the shareholders. 
Driven from the four principles, fundamental rights of the shareholders are the following; 
the right to receive dividends, the right to acquire information , the right to participate in 
general assemblies, the right to vote and challenge resolutions at the general assemblies, 
the right to appoint and dismiss the board at the general assembly, the right to have the 
company audited (through application to the statutory auditors), the right to file 
complaints and take civil action against directors who failed to duly perform their duties 
under certain conditions, and the right to participate in capital increases. General 
Assembly is the highest organ of the company and it is the primary vehicle for exercising 
shareholders rights. General assembly can not delegate the rights of the shareholders to 
decide on dividends (the law acknowledges profit as the ultimate purpose of the 
shareholders). The right to acquire information (limited to the right to review the financial 
reports and ask questions), the right to appoint and dismiss the directors and the right to 
participate and vote can not be abolished. Each share must have one vote, but multiple 
voting rights and non-voting shares are allowed if included in the articles34. Any changes 
in the articles must be voted with one share one vote principle regardless of the voting 
privileges35. Shareholders can not vote on matters related with them personally or their 
first degree relatives. Shares may have privileges related with the allocation of profit. In 
fact most companies have founder shares which entitle the founders a certain percentage 
of net profit similar to an ongoing founders fee. Usufruct shares (or dividend certificates), 
which are not a part of the capital, entitle the founders with additional cash flow rights. 
Under law, the right to nominate board members can be allocated to a group of shares. 
This concept is different than privileged shares, as the privilege is not connected to a 
“class” of share but a “group” of “ordinary shares”. In most cases when the shareholders 
sell the shares designated under a group with nomination rights, the privilege is 
disconnected from the share. CML also allows non-voting privileged shares but they are 
not common.  
Joint stock companies with more than 250 shareholders are considered publicly owned 
and they are subject to CML36. CML further provides that shareholders have the right to 
                                                 
33 Although joint stock companies are recognized as legal persons under law, the criminal liability is personal 
under the Turkish Criminal Code (2004). Therefore no penal sanctions are allowed to be implemented on legal 
entities; however security measures are allowed such as cancellation of permissions and confiscation of the 
assets. 
34 The Draft CC restricts the multiple for voting rights by 15 
35 The procedure for amending the Articles is inefficient. It involves 7 steps; board decision, ISE Disclosure, 
CMB application and approval, ministry application and approval, AGM approval, ISE disclosure, Trade 
Registry 
36 In the Draft CML, this number is increased  to 500 
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acquire information through disclosure of material events, the right to go to courts to 
abolish decisions of the board under certain conditions, the right to vote through proxy, 
and the right to cumulative voting if the articles permit. 
Minority rights start at 10% in CC and 5% in CML37. These rights include the right to 
postpone the discussions on financial reports for a month and the right to request special 
auditor to investigate alleged abuses. If this does not happen, then they are entitled to 
request the courts to appoint an auditor. If alleged abuses were to be found 
unsubstantiated, the minority shareholders are liable for damages caused to the company 
if they are proven to have acted in bad faith. Minority shareholders can call general 
assembly and add items to the agenda, veto the dismissal of the board, and have the right 
to take the directors to court.  
Preemptive rights can be restricted by general assembly under CC and by the boards in 
public companies if they adopt the “registered capital system” and articles allow for it. 
According to the CML, restrictions of preemptive rights can not violate the principle of 
equality between the shareholders; therefore restrictions of preemptive rights are common 
in issuing new shares for public offerings. Merger contracts are subject to shareholder 
approval but major asset transactions are not according to CC or CML. Tender offers are 
mandated at acquisition of 25%, 50% and at every additional 10% of shares within a 12 
month period. Privatization of state owned shares of listed companies is usually 
exempted. CMB may grant exemptions based on criteria defined in the regulations. It has 
become a routine practice to request exemption; more than 50 requests were made to the 
CMB in the past 3 years. Furthermore, since the privately entered agreements between 
controlling shareholders which may include non-pecuniary benefits are not disclosed and 
there is no disclosure requirement on the acquirer to share their insight of the acquired 
firm at the time of mandatory call, it is doubtful whether the transaction price reflects the 
maximum achievable transaction price. The sanctions/penalties are not deterrent and 15 
day offer period is not sufficient.  
AGMs must be convened by the Board within 3 months after the end of the accounting 
period, but in practice this is extended for another 1-2 months due to the time required for 
external audit. The Board proposes a dividend policy at the assembly. Every shareholder 
has the right to review the documents at the company headquarters at least 15 days before 
the assembly. For registered shares the documents are posted to shareholders.  There is no 
requirement to disclose the documents or send them to the shareholders.  CMB 
Guidelines require a 3 week period and that the notice should be given through both mail 
and electronic means and details the documents that should be included with the notice. 
Shareholders may vote by appointing a representative through a power of attorney (the 
proxy must be notarized).38 Under the CC, there is a requirement of 1/3 quorum for 
adjourned meeting to amend articles there is no requirement for a quorum for adjourned 
meetings for public companies. AGMs are considered as a legal formality in Turkey. 
Holders of bearer shares and their proxies are required to receive admission cards or 
deposit certificates but this is not necessary for registered shares as the records of the 
central registry have primacy over companies’ share registrar 
                                                 
37 Guidelines recommend that the companies should target lower figures. 
38 International institutional shareholders usually participate in the assemblies through their custodians and the 
same few names appear in all attendance charts. General practice is to vote “against” unless required for 
quorum.  
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Shareholders can file complaints with CMB, ISE or the relevant ministries, shareholders 
who were present but had voted against a resolution or were deprived of voting rights, can 
request nullification of the resolution from the courts if decision was against the law, 
articles or good faith according to Articles 381 of the CC Boards can also appeal to the 
courts for nullification of the AGM decisions.  
Failures to provide information can be filed with the statutory auditors. Class actions or 
derivative actions are not recognized by law but if there is more than one appeal 
requesting nullification of AGM decisions, these cases are combined. 
Insider trading, the dissemination of misleading or false information and manipulative 
practices are criminal offences punishable by fines and imprisonment up to 5 years. CMB 
is responsible for surveillance and investigation and file with public prosecutors in case of 
suspect. There is no definition of “related part” in law, accept for financial reporting 
purposes under IFRS. 
The rights of the stakeholders are not cited in CML or CC, however the CMB Guidelines 
has a separate section on stakeholders. Listed companies are required to disclose their 
policies related with the treatment of the primary stakeholders such as creditors, 
customers, employees end the society at large. Employee stock option or ownership plans 
are not provided for under Turkish law. 
CMB Guidelines have comprehensive provisions by requiring that the provisions 
restricting proxy voting, share transfers should not be included in a company’s articles. It 
calls for one share one vote and state that voting privileges should be avoided. It 
recommends that cumulative voting should be included in the articles, a provision that is 
not yet accepted by any company. The Guidelines require that major asset transactions 
should require shareholder approval.  
The CMB announces mandatory dividend rates every year. 
The Draft CC introduces substantial and radical improvements to shareholders rights as 
summarized in Table 4 below. 
 
Table 4 -  Articles related with minority shareholders rights in the Draft Turkish 
Company Law 
 
Article  Rights subject to private litigation 
141 Right to exit in mergers 
200 Right to exit in case of abuse of dominant position by the controlling shareholder  
438 Right to demand special audit 
466 Right to participate in conditional issues of shares 
466 Right to demand equal treatment 
193 Right to demand nullification  of major decisions from the courts 
194 Right to hold the management liable for the consequences of major decisions 
202 Right to seek remedy in case of abuse of power by the controlling shareholder 
399 Right to request change of auditor 
447 Right to request the nullification of AGM decisions 
428, 429 Right to have cumulative voting rights and cumulative representation 
428, 429 Obligation for the institutional representative to receive authorization before the AGM 
200, 437 Right to request information and investigation 
479 Limitation on voting privileges   
198, 150 Disclosure obligations for exceeding threshold values in share acquisitions  
1502, 1505 Right to vote electronically and right to receive information electronically  
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It aligns the company law with EU’s Transparency Directive by introducing mandatory 
bid provisions, squeeze in and squeeze out provisions. It focuses on making it easy for the 
shareholders to exercise their rights and increases the efficiency of shareholder rights 
significantly. For example it allows the general assemblies to be recorded and 
broadcasted, and requires all join stock companies to allow electronic voting. It classifies 
the auditors into 3 groups; year end auditor, transaction auditor (mergers, capital increase, 
incorporation, IPO etc) and special auditor in case of alleged abuse.39 One important 
contribution of the Draft is related with the representation of groups in cumulative voting 
based on a common attribute such as the distributors of an automotive company. Another 
creative provision is the concept of institutional representative concept which allows 
pooling of individual shareholders to exercise voting rights collectively.  
Practice 
A joint survey conducted by the World Bank and Lex Mundi40 places Turkey 73rd among 
155 countries surveyed with respect to ease of protecting shareholders rights. According 
to the survey Turkey receives 8 out of 10 for extent of disclosure, 3 out of 10 for extent of 
director liability, 4 out 10 for ease of shareholders suit resulting in an overall score of 5.0 
out of 10 for ease of protecting investors.  
BORYAD, the association of individual investors in listed stocks complains about the 
level of shareholder protection in Turkey on a report in their Web-site.41 The report 
complains about nomination privileges assigned to certain group of shares, extensive use 
of multiple voting rights, outright transfer pricing resulting in persistent low performance 
of listed companies within groups against high performance of unlisted firms within the 
same group and abuse of minority rights by controlling shareholders by avoiding 
mandatory calls in the event of mergers and acquisitions. They also point out the negative 
consequences of inclusion of a company in Watch List by the CMB for small investors as 
the prices go down and controlling shareholders buy the lower valued stocks for 
speculative purposes. BORYAD also claims that mutual funds underperform in Turkey 
against the ISE overall index due to malpractices of fund managers such as fictive trading 
to increase their income from commissions or manipulative transactions in collusion with 
other market players. It recommends setting up specialized Financial Courts as a means of 
private ordering against abusive controlling shareholders, daily disclosure of trading 
volumes of funds and disclosure of fund managers’ performance at the year end. 
Given the ambiguity of the CC, the main document that is the basis of the shareholders 
rights is the Articles of Association. In 2005, only 11 of ISE-30 companies disclosed their 
Articles on their Web sites.  
Transfer of shares is still problematic. Shareowners are required to register their 
ownership in the share register maintained by the board in case of nominee shares but this 
is sometimes required of the shares registered with the Central Registry. 23% of he 
companies are reported to have provisions imposing limitations on transfer of shares by 
                                                 
39 For details, see the section on Information Disclosure and Audit Standards 
40 “Protecting Investors, Doing Business”, WB,IFC/Lex Mundi, 2006 
41 www.boryad.org , Reports 
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the CMB according to the survey conducted in 2004. CMB further reports that 42% of the 
companies have privileged shares with nomination rights. Other practice related issues are 
as follows; 
• Cross ownership is an issue for the effectiveness of AGMs 
• Most companies have “registered capital” systems (73%) which authorize the 
board for an indefinite period to issue new shares up to the limit of registered 
capital without shareholder approval42.  
• Disclosure of material events is not sufficient 
• In case of M&As, many aspects of the deal are not transparent since share    
purchase agreement and shareholders agreement are not disclosed  
• There is no requirement to consult shareholders in case of major asset sales   
 
Due to technical and capacity constrains, the enforcement is unsatisfactory. Most of the 
alleged violations of CML are reported to be related to market manipulation.  
b. Functioning of Boards  
Legal Framework 
Joint stock companies are governed by a one-tier board by law. The board represents the 
company in her dealings with third parties. The board can appoint a “registered” general 
manager in charge of day to day management who would have fiduciary duties even if he 
does not sit in the board. The board may also assign some of its powers to one or more 
board members as “managing directors”. In this case the delegated directors are liable for 
the matters they are authorized.  Board members who do not have signatory powers are 
not responsible for any wrongdoings that they have not been involved. Physical meeting 
of the board is not required; matters may be resolved on paper. Decisions become binding 
upon signing the minutes in the Board Resolutions Register. Board members must be 
shareholders, or representatives of a legal entity shareholder43. There is no requirement 
for qualification for becoming a director except for the boards of regulated industries 
(banks and insurance companies etc.). Board members can not compete with the firm. 
Any business dealings they may have with the company have to be approved by the 
board. 
Under law, the board is required to perform its activities with diligence, care, foresight 
and good faith. Their duty and responsibility is to the “company” not to the shareholders. 
Its members are accountable to the company for losses created by their actions, but they 
are not directly responsible for losses created by managers. While they are not directly 
responsible for transactions concluded on behalf of the company they are jointly liable for 
their actions if the books and records are not kept in accordance with law, dividends are 
not paid, general assembly decisions are not implemented without reason, negligently and 
intentionally fail to perform their  duties defined by law or the company  articles. 
Registered general managers are also liable for matters they have been officially 
authorized by the board. Board members are nominated, appointed and dismissed by the 
shareholders at the general assembly. 
                                                 
42 Draft CC limits the period with 5 years 
43 Draft CC eliminates this requirement 
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Listed companies are subject to further rules. CMB’s Guidelines require classification of 
board members as executive, non-executive and independent non-executive. They also 
require the board to set up an Audit Committee, and a Corporate Governance Committee 
in charge of developing and overseeing the CG charter of the company, as well as being 
responsible for nomination and remuneration of board members and senior managers. It 
recommends separation of the CEO and the Chairman roles and requires at least one third 
of the board members to be independent. Independence criteria are well established. 
Boards are asked to assess their performance, play a key role in setting the strategic 
direction and oversee the implementation. Board members   are required to have 
sufficient knowledge and expertise to fulfill their responsibility according to the 
Guidelines. The Guidelines further require that the remuneration of the board and senior 
executives should be performance based.  Relevant members of the board and the CFO 
must sign off the financial statements. The Guidelines recommend Cumulative Voting for 
board appointment, which has not been observed by any company so far. Cumulative 
Voting is mandatory for unlisted companies with more than 500 shareholders44.  The 
Principles also calls for a Code of Ethics and requires disclosure of social and 
environmental and stakeholder relations policies.  
The Draft CC provides a much improved and revolutionary framework for the boards. 
First of all the Draft acknowledges different groups of shareholders and their right to 
representation as explained above. It introduces the concept of individual responsibility as 
opposed to collective responsibility aligning the level of authority with the level of 
liability for individual board members. An important aspect of the Draft is the recognition 
of separate roles of management (execution) and control (board). It authorizes the board 
to delegate day to day management to executives based on an official charter. Corporate 
Governance Guidelines Compliance statement, which should remain accessible on the 
company Web site for 3 years, is a reserved responsibility of the Board. Furthermore, 
assurance of compliance with IFRS is defined as a collective responsibility of the Board. 
Board is obliged to set up Risk Assessment and Management Committees, the first of its 
kind in the world. The restriction of trading with the company for board members is 
extended to companies in which the board members have more than 20% stake. 
Restrictions on extending loans to the board members are reinforced.  
Probably the most innovative provisions of the Draft are related with business groups. 
The Draft requires the disclosure of the scope of control exercised by the parent on the 
subsidiary company by both the parent board and subsidiary board ex-ante and ex-post 
respectively. According to the Draft, the subsidiary boards and the salaried managers 
would not be liable for the consequences of decisions made or influenced by the parent in 
line with the principle of matching liabilities with authority. Table 5 presents the 
provisions related with the transparency of group structures.     
 
Table 5 – Provisions Related with Group Companies and Pyramidal Structures in 
the Draft Turkish Company law 
 
Article Provision Comments 
195 Provides description of controlling 
shareholder, parent and subsidiary, group of 
companies. “Operations” whether they are in 
In our opinion this is one of the most important 
introductions in the Draft. It assumes that 
“control” implies and includes “management”. 
                                                 
44 There are significant amount of pending cases opened by minority shareholders of unlisted companies for 
failing to implement the cumulative voting.   
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the form of a company or else (one owner) 
and   overseas operations are included in the 
definition. 
The opposite can not be defended. Control can be 
exercised through direct or indirect cascaded or 
pyramidal ownership structures and privileged 
shares. The definition includes off balance sheet 
operations in the group structure. The law relies 
on the importance of reputational risks for the 
groups.   
199 Obliges both the parent and the subsidiary to 
report on the relation in between,  defines 
“Dependence Report” as a statutory report 
Forces the related party transactions and 
pyramidal control relations   to be disclosed 
201 Limits the voting rights of the subsidiary in 
the parent with 25%  
 
202-203 Abuse of control rights by the parent is 
prevented by law (asset transfer, transfer 
pricing, preventing investments and growth, 
sacrificing the continuity of the subsidiary for 
the benefit of the company). This abuse can be 
based on an instruction or influence.   
In our opinion this is one of the most important 
provisions in the Draft. The Article provides for 
the right of the shareholders of the subsidiary to 
seek remedy for harms caused by the parent for 
AGM decisions that they have voted against   
203, 204, 
205 
Parent board can give instructions and the 
subsidiary board can refuse to implement 
them if they lead to bankruptcy or illiquidity  
Board members of the subsidiary can not be held 
liable for the decisions made on instruction from 
the parent, however such instructions can only be 
based on pre-defined  concrete policies 
208 Right to buy the minority shares Parent has the squeeze out the minority if it has 
more than 95% of the shares 
206 Parent company has to balance the losses of 
the subsidiary  
This article suggests that subsidiary boards can 
sign contracts to transfer financial liabilities to the 
parent 
 
 
The Draft requires that the board members have higher education, a much debated 
provision. It acknowledges cumulative voting and notes that it can be mandated by the 
CMB in the Preamble. The Draft specifies the reserved powers of the board that can not 
be delegated, a substantial improvement over the current law. It also requires DOL 
insurance and mandates the disclosure of the limits. 
Practice 
Boards usually consist of members and representatives of controlling shareholders. Day 
to day operations is delegated to professional managers. Designating one or more of the 
members as “managing director” (murahhas aza) who would closely supervise the 
“general manager” is common. Even when the general manager is included in the board 
and given the title so called “CEO”, her authority is limited45. In practice, managing 
directors are usually family members or loyal professionals trusted by the controlling 
shareholders. Distrust to professionals is common.  
In a survey conducted by the CMB46 in 2004, listed companies are asked to report on 
their level of compliance with the CG Guidelines before compliance report made 
mandatory. 69% of the companied did not make any statement about the compliance with 
the CG Principles in their annual reports. According to the survey only 9% of the 
companies had established a CG committee. 78% of the boards include non-executive 
members but in most cases they are either the members or friends of the controlling 
family. The CMB reports no acknowledgement of cumulative voting. It further reports 
                                                 
45 Forbes  
46 Survey results are available from CMB. 
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that only 4% of the boards are compensated on the basis of company performance. Only 
50% of the companies prohibit the board members to compete or have business with the 
company despite the restrictions, 85% of companies have no qualification requirements 
for the board members and only 9% have a corporate governance committee.  On the 
other hand, 71% of the companies disclose their transactions with key managers and 
shareholders. The CC allows the board to receive up to 5% of net profits as compensation 
for the board services, subject to the approval by the assembly and provided that the 
company pays dividends. This directorship fee is a main source of legitimate profit 
transfer to family members. Directorship fee for board attendance is also defined in the 
CC but it is rarely used. The same survey is repeated in 2006 but the results are not yet 
available. In a presentation on the survey, CMB reported that the disclosure on 
compliance was less than satisfactory. According to the survey, 61% of the companies did 
not provide an assessment of their internal control mechanisms, only 22% of the 
companies provided any explanation on major risks, and 82% of the companies did not 
provide any information about their Board members. CMB concluded that the majority of 
the companies did not understand the CG concepts and the intentions behind the 
guidelines.     
In practice companies do not disclose much about the board and board processes. 
Disclosure about the functioning of the board is significantly poorer than financial 
disclosure or ownership disclosure47. This may be considered as less important since the 
traditional agency problems are less significant in “insider” systems, however the opacity 
may be an indication of informality/lack of professionalism in the functioning of the 
board. The fact that only 50% of the listed companies have a mission or vision statement 
disclosed to the public may be indicative of this lack of formalism. Indeed, Aksu and 
Kosedag (2005) reports using the S&P/CGFT T&D survey data that between the extreme 
quartiles of lowest and highest scores, companies with higher scores especially in the 
category of board structure and management processes disclosures, have higher returns 
and accounting measures of profitability. Obviously, the level of disclosure is not the 
cause of better performance but a proxy of the importance given to the board’s role and of 
the existence of a formal system of governance. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that board meetings are rather short and important decisions 
are made by the controlling families outside the board. Research reveals that larger 
companies have less frequent board meetings (average 7) whereas smaller and unlisted 
companies have more frequent meetings (average 13). This may be because as the 
outsider/insider ratio increases with size, more decisions are taken outside the board by 
controlling shareholders. Employees of parent companies frequently sit in the boards of 
subsidiaries mainly for effective oversight.  Often these employees are trusted members 
of the extended family and the number of boards they sit in may be in excess of 20.  
Kocer48 reports significant difference between the composition and the functions of the 
boards of group companies and non-group companies. In the Turkish context, group 
companies are expected to be more efficiently run as they have access to resources and 
expertise and they give more priority to the oversight of management of affiliated 
companies. This oversight is generally performed via the board members who are salaried 
employees of the parent whereas the boards of non-group firms focus more on monitoring 
the execution of board decisions. The study finds out that the average tenure for the board 
                                                 
47 Ararat, Balic and Bradley (2005) 
48 Kocer 2006 
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members of listed companies is 8.7 years. 70% of the board members sit in more than one 
board and 80% of them sit in the boards of other companies within the same group.  
Average tenure for General Managers is found to be 7 years. This figure is lower in group 
companies which may indicate better oversight of management. Average board size is 6.8 
and 70% of the members are insiders. Independent board members (according to the 
perception of the respondents) make up 13% of the boards. Independence is voted as the 
list important criteria in selecting board members. Only 19% of the companies have a 
Chairman who is not a major shareholder and 38% are the founders. The survey reveals 
that board members spend 36 hours a year in board meetings. 80% of the meetings enjoy 
full participation. The percentage of executive board members increases with the CEO 
tenure. Board nomination is mainly undertaken by the Chairman according to the 
respondents. Chairman plays the most significant role in setting the agenda for board 
meetings. 
Yildirim and Usdiken’s recent research on family owned business groups  in Turkey finds 
out that  group companies ran by successive generations have less family members and 
more salaried managers on their  boards. According to the survey larger the firms, larger 
the boards and larger the percentage of family members in the boards. As expected, listed 
companies within the groups tend to have more outsiders on the board, however, the fact 
that companies run by successive generations have fewer outsiders compared to the ones 
run by he founders casts doubts on the role of outsiders. They may not serve as carriers of 
“modernization” according to the authors; outsiders are likely to be “friends”. An 
interesting finding of the study is that board size increases with foreign ownership. Indeed 
foreign ownership is negatively associated with the percentage of salaried managers 
(professionals) on the board. Authors suggest that this may be due to the need to open up 
space for the new shareholders/partners. 
Yurtoglu49 also reports that more than half of the board of listed companies consist of 
large shareholders with the same family name if the board size is smaller than 6.  
Interviews with key Executive Search firms operating in Turkey complete the picture; the 
request for search for board membership is unheard of. The same applies to general 
managers. Even when a search is commissioned for senior managers, the 
owners/managers may opt for a candidate recommended by a friend or a trusted advisor.   
The remuneration of directors is not disclosed except the total cash benefits even though 
the CMB Guidelines recommend individual and detailed disclosure.  
There is no insight to the board nomination process. According to CMB, 42% of the listed 
companies have groups of shares with nomination rights. Under law, board members can 
only be nominated by shareholders during the general assembly; while nomination rights 
prevent chaotic general assemblies - where any shareholder can nominate a director, it 
also negates the utility of board nomination committees and confers considerable power 
to single block holders. In most cases shareholder agreements specify the nominations 
rights assigned to share groups and the respective number of members depend on the 
percentage of shares owned. This practice positions boards as a coalition of interests and 
makes it impossible to have independent members in the board since a director nominated 
by a certain group of shares is considered to be the representative of  the shareholders of 
the respective group of shares. Establishment of nomination committees may only serve 
as a facade unless the articles incorporate some form of recognition of the work of 
                                                 
49 Yurtoglu (2000) 
Page 26 
Melsa Ararat, Hakan Orbay 
nomination committees by the shareholders in nominating directors.  Currently it remains 
as a black box for the outsiders how the board members are nominated.    
It is reported that the so-called “independent” board members currently sitting in the 
boards of listed companies are chosen from a pool of 20-25 individuals and their primary 
role is to advise rather than “tactfully” challenge the controlling shareholders.50 The list 
includes a substantial number of ex-public servants and military officers suggesting the 
importance of managing relations with the state.  
Prevailing view is that the board’s primary responsibility is to the controlling 
shareholders, despite the law.  For example in the case of acquisition of Yapi Kredi Bank 
by Koc Finans (the controlling shareholder of Koc Bank), a number of key decisions were 
made between respective controlling families regarding the future of the resulting entity 
including the treatment of the debts owed by the controlling family to Yapi Kredi Bank 
and the committed purchases of services from companies owned by the same controlling 
shareholder.  Media coverage on issues on the  planned merger between Koc Bank and 
Yapi Kredi Bank forced the CMB request information from the only possible source; the 
board of public Yapi Kredi Bank who responded by stating that they have not discussed 
any such matters in the meetings of the Board. 
The practice of nominating salaried employees of the parent to the boards of the 
subsidiaries by the controlling shareholders is common and perhaps legitimate; however 
there is no disclosure requirement on how and under what restrictions they perform their 
role. Such salaried employees share their insight about the company’s financial status and 
plans with the controlling shareholders, and without doubt they take executive orders 
from them. There is no requirement of disclosure about this dependency and privilege to 
information. 
A survey of company Web sites and CG Compliance Reports supports demonstrates that 
controlling shareholders consider board committees as formalities as there is  no evidence 
of structured procedures and  charters. 
c. Disclosure and Transparency 
Until recently disclosure was not considered a public good in Turkey. One reason is that 
the users of information were limited by the state (for tax purposes) and the controlling 
shareholders who had privileged access to all company information. The dependency on 
private and internal sources of finance exacerbated this situation. Credit rating was not a 
regular practices and bank lending was based on personal guarantees and collateral. 
Persistent inflation continued to distort the financial information further in the absence of 
inflation adjusted accounting.  
Reliability and availability of information (first of all financial information and 
information related with ownership structures are fundamental for a well functioning 
economy. Experience shows that the most effective corporate governance reforms are 
related with disclosure and audit standards in emerging markets. 
Legal and Regulatory Framework 
Current regulations regarding disclosure and transparency standards for privately owned 
companies are purely tax driven except companies within regulated industries where the 
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relevant authorities impose rules for regulatory purposes.  CMB regulates the accounting; 
reporting and audit standards, and functions for publicly held companies except regulated 
industries; banks and insurance. Publicly held companies are required to file financial 
reports with the ISE and the CMB on a quarterly basis. Annual audited financial 
statements must be published in at least two daily papers. Disclosure of material events is 
expanded by recent regulations and includes changes in ownership and management, 
purchase, sales or lease of assets above a certain threshold, changes in investments, 
ownership interests in other companies, managerial problems, block sales and unusual 
price fluctuations. The regulation does not apply to consolidated entities. There is no 
requirement to make audited financial statements available to public other than to the 
regulators.  
The CMB and ISE must be notified of any purchases or sale of shares amounting to 1% 
by any acquirer (or acquirers acting in concert) who already holds 3% or more of the 
voting rights. Disclosure is also required in crossing the 3% threshold upwards and 
downwards. The directors and the general managers must comply with the ownership 
change disclosure requirements and must also disclose any conflicts of interests with the 
company. Companies who are subject to disclosure rules of foreign exchanges must 
disclose the same information also in Turkey. According to the related communiqué, 
purchase or sale of the stocks of the corporation by such persons as chairman or members 
of the board of directors, general directors or assistant general directors, other individuals 
with significant decision making authorities in the corporation, shareholders who directly 
or indirectly own 5% or more of the capital or voting rights, and the individuals who act 
with the persons cited above must be disclosed,  but the terms “related party” and “people 
acting in concert” are not clearly explained. 
Existing accounting, reporting and audit standards for privately held companies are 
extremely poor.  CC sets minimum bookkeeping requirements but they are not helpful in 
preparing financial reports. Accounting regulations established by Ministry of Finance 
(Tax Procedural Law, Accounting System Implementation Regulation and Uniform Chart 
of Accounts) take precedence over all other regulations and are primarily concerned about 
taxation. Publicly listed companies and regulated sector companies (Banks and Insurance) 
are subject to more comprehensive disclosure regimes; however they have shortcomings 
in certain aspects. Furthermore their requirements are additional to the requirements of 
the Ministry of Finance. Each agency (CMB, BRSA, the Treasury and the MoF) develop 
its own accounting and audit requirements. For example, listed banks are subject to 
BRSA’s regulations, demonstrating the little appreciation of the financial information 
available to all market players. Under the amended CML, a Turkish Accounting 
Standards Board was established in 2002 as an autonomous entity under the authority of 
the CMB to develop national accounting standards, but its legitimacy is not supported by 
law51. TASB translated all of the existing IFRS to Turkish, but failed to use IFRS 
approved translation process which resulted in some “contextualization”.  Principle-based 
approach of IFRS is not compliant with the rule –based traditions in Turkey and requires 
high quality and experienced professionals which Turkey currently has a shortage of.   
Accounting standards issued by the CMB closely follow IFRS which became effective in 
the beginning of 2005. In practice many listed companies have been issuing IFRS based 
reports since 2003 as early adaptation was permitted, however these reports sometimes 
were not disclosed except to potential investors, rating agencies and institutional 
                                                 
51 Draft CC provides the legal basis for an independent TSAB. 
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shareholders.52 For example, after the announcement of the BRSA in the beginning of 
2005 that inflation adjustment was no longer necessary (even though Turkey qualified for 
hyperinflation according to the IFRS), most banks did not disclose their certified accounts 
based on IFRS but made them available to selected investors.        
The key difference between the current standards and the IAS and IFRS for listed 
companies is related with CG is in the area of related party transactions and consolidated 
financial statements. One other issue is that Turkey still qualifies for hyperinflationary 
economy but the Ministry of Finance declared that inflation adjustments would not be 
applied as of 2005.53 As per the banks, key issues revolve also around consolidation (non 
financial subsidiaries are not consolidated against the provisions of IAS 27) and related 
party disclosures. The weaknesses on both parts add to the opacity of business groups 
which include a bank.     
In Turkey are no general audit standards that apply to all companies. Each agency defines 
its own applicable standards. CMB has made significant progress in improving the audit 
standards during the past few years. There are 40 firms authorized to audit insurance 
firms, 42 firms authorized to audit banks, and 84 firms authorized by the CMB to audit 
publicly held companies. The authorization is based on structures rather than capacity. 
TURMOB is legally mandated and authorized to issue professional licenses and set 
standards. It has good financial sources, however the professional standards are low; there 
is no requirement for continued education and licensing exams are focused on taxation 
issues in line with the role defined by the laws for audits. A license from TURMOB is a 
prerequisite for obtaining a license from CMB, BRSA or GDI to audit companies 
regulated by these agencies. Individuals with certain qualifications (academicians, 
seniority in profession, x-civil servants) are exempted from exams. The professional fees 
are regulated. As such the audit profession is not subject to public oversight independent 
of profession as required by the 8th Directive.   
The Draft CC provides legal basis for the TASB as the national authority on accounting 
standards and it specifies IFRS as the national standards. It introduces a concept of 
“financial statement and annual report audit”. Auditors are expected to audit both the 
financial statements and the annual report; auditing of the financial statements would be 
to ensure adherence to accounting and financial reporting standards as well as to the 
company’s articles of association, auditing of annual report is expected to ensure the 
report represents a true and fair picture of the company’s position to the shareholders. 
Obligation to have a Web-site with a special section dedicated to statutory shareholder   
communication with historical data is another reflection of intensions to improve the 
transparency. The provision of the Draft related with the transparency and disclosure are 
listed in Table 6 The proposed legislation encourages extensive use of electronic 
disclosure by the joint stock companies and mandates it for listed companies. The scope 
of disclosure is radically expanded with special provision for disclosure of related party 
                                                 
52 Voluntary disclosure has been gradually improving in parallel to statutory requirements. Aksu and Kosedag 
(2005) surveyed the companies that are constituencies of S&P/IFC Turkey Index and found that 66% of the 
companies had opted for early adoption of IFRS as of 2003 voluntarily before it became mandatory in 2005.  
53 This misjudgment caused problems for companies who have been voluntarily using IFRS; the audit 
companies refused to certify the accounts as being compliant with IFRS if inflation adjustments were not 
applied. Some companies opted for not disclosing their IFRS compliant reports to the public as they would 
diverse from the reports prepared in accordance with the local standards and regulations. The whole situation 
created additional burden for companies and auditors who opt for full compliance. 
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transactions. It specifies different levels of approval such as conditional approval (a 
practice which is not in compliance with IAS). 
 
 
Table 6: Major Provisions Related with Disclosure and Transparency in the Draft 
Turkish Company Law  
 
Article  Provision  Comments 
88, 517 Adoption of Turkish Accounting Standards 
based on IFRS 
 
398 Auditors responsibility to audit both  
financial statements (and compliance with 
the company’s AoA), and the annual report  
Auditors are required to warn the 
companies in written about the risks, 
article provides details 
400 Auditors independence is ensured based on 
relations with the company’s shareholders , 
duration of services  and other services 
offered to the company 
Auditor rotation is implied by manning 
the same auditor to approve the 
statements 6 times in 10 years. Consulting 
services are limited with 30% of the 
revenue. 
402,403,404 Management letter is mandatory and  to be 
disclosed, risks are reported separately 
Detailed explanations are provided, the 
objective is set as “true and fair “ 
representation  
1502-1505 Web site obligations  
 
 
Practice 
The CMB Survey reports that only 36% of listed companies disclose their ultimate 
ownership structure. The disclosure of real person owners is required only in the IPO 
prospectus. In many cases controlling shareholders indirectly own shares by using off-
shore companies in addition to pyramidal ownership.   
In practice companies comply with the disclosure requirements. CMB and ISE issue 
private and public warnings impose financial penalties or suspend trading by putting 
companies on “watch list” by limiting trading of the shares by 30 minutes. This practice is 
criticized since it allows the controlling shareholders an opportunity to buy back at a 
discount.   
Majority of so called “audits” conducted in Turkey are related to “tax certification” and 
they differ in terms of their purpose and content of an audit. CMB’s auditing 
requirements which are closest to the ISA also fall short of ISA and IFAC. On the other 
hand, some audits are conducted in Turkey accordance to ISA by big four audit firms 
based on the requirement of the issuers but without being subject to any regulation. Audit 
capacity is severely limited casting doubts about the quality of audits of reports based on 
IFRS.  
Surveys conducted by the Corporate Governance Forum (CGFT) of Sabanci University in 
cooperation with Standard and Poor’s demonstrate that the level of disclosure of publicly 
held firms even for the most liquid and largest cap companies is moderate. The survey has 
been conducted in 2004 and 2005 based on the annual reports and Web disclosure of 50 
largest and highest valued firms in Turkey. The key findings of the survey illustrate that 
disclosure levels remain highest with respect to financial transparency and lowest in 
board structure and processes. Overall improvements in disclosure levels are greatest 
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among those companies that scored lowest in 2005 and disclosure levels between holding 
companies and their subsidiaries continue to diverge. Concerns therefore remain with 
respect to the transparency of groups. The banking sector shows the greatest improvement 
in disclosure levels as well as some of the listed companies with state participation and 
control has demonstrated a radical improvement in disclosure levels. This may be related 
to the ongoing preparations for the privatization of state shares. It has also been observed 
that companies' articles of association (AoA), which were not typically disclosed, are now 
increasingly becoming available on company Web sites, as recommended by the CMB. 
This is particularly important because shareholders' rights are primarily governed by the 
AoA. Some key deficiencies in disclosure were related with ownership structures; 
shareholder agreements between the holders of different classes and board nomination 
processes were not disclosed by any company. There was no disclosure of policies or 
practices related with parent control.  Some key disclosures and improvements  were as 
follows: Details of related-party transactions (disclosed by approximately 90% of 
companies; 60% in 2005), information on the presence of independent or non-executive 
directors on the board (60%; 25% in 2005), whether an audit committee exists 
(approximately 70%; 40% in 2005), information on the AoA (approximately 75%; 30% 
in 2005), information on any (in)formal voting agreements or blocks (approximately 
30%; 5% in 2005), details of different types of shares (approximately 60%; 50% in 2005), 
a description of the board nomination process (approximately 50%; none in 2005), 
whether group-wide policies applicable to subsidiaries exist (no real change: less than 5% 
disclosure, compared with nondisclosure in 2005). Considering that the 50 companies 
included are arguably the best in class, the average disclosure is expected to be much 
lower.54  
Promotion of better Corporate Governance standards is generally thought to benefit the 
firm through improved access to equity financing facilitated by reducing tunneling of 
wealth from shareholders. While this rationale is appropriate for developed countries, it 
seems a too narrow approach for emerging economies. 
First of all, given the general scarcity of domestic capital in emerging countries, improved 
corporate governance provides a marginal improvement, if any, for accessing equity 
capital. Consequently, this is not a sufficiently strong incentive for firms to adopt better 
governance practices.  
In the context of emerging economies, the links between economic development and 
corporate governance should be strengthened. While equity financing is important for 
growth of industries, and therefore economic development, competitiveness and 
innovation capacity are also vital attributes for growth. 
We argue that current governance practices in Turkey, in particular non-separation of 
executive management and control functions have serious implications, possibly 
preventing companies to achieve their full growth potential. Below, we will first discuss 
two salient features of Turkish environment – culture of control and black economy – and 
their effects on governance. These two features are significant factors inhibiting majority 
owners to delegate power to professionals. We then outline growth implications of 
consequent amalgamation of ownership, control and executive management functions. 
                                                 
54 The ROSC report on Accounting and Auditing prepared by the WB staff in 2005 provides an excellent review 
of the topic. 
Page 31 
Melsa Ararat, Hakan Orbay 
d. A culture of control 
In Turkish corporations, there is a pervasive tendency that majority owners exercise 
excessive control over the companies. Typically, several board members take on 
executive oversight role, effectively limiting executive powers of professional managers. 
While this may be a cultural issue, the effect of weak judicial system cannot be ignored. 
Essentially, lack of trust to legal system renders contractual relations ineffective. 
Perceived inability to enforce employment contracts for punishment of wrong doing 
forces owners to relationship-based mode of operation, which indeed requires higher 
levels of direct control.  
Changing the governance form is the most important challenge faced by the Turkish 
private sector. Managing this change will require that owner-managers relinquish their 
executive roles and delegate their executive powers to new professional managers - not to 
mention accepting the need for greater transparency. Such a system would power 
management to become the driving, entrepreneurial force in the company while enabling 
the board to monitor executive performance, and reward them accordingly. Even if 
owner-managers come to terms with the need for change, instituting a system of formal 
checks and balance and finding skilled and experienced professional managers in the 
local labour market will not be easy.  New skills will not become available overnight and 
it will also take time before market forces develop the ability to replace the direct 
monitoring, currently exercised by block holders with specialised monitoring - namely 
ex-ante monitoring by investment banks, intermediary monitoring by analysts, fund 
managers and ex-post monitoring by takeover markets and reorganisations specialists etc.   
 
e. Grey  Economy 
Black economy has been a persistent problem in Turkish business sector. For companies, 
the primary reason to engage in unregistered transactions is to avoid taxes. However, it 
should be noted that the prevalence of this practice is a consequence of weak 
enforcement. Clearly, in the absence of effective punishment, all companies are forced to 
follow the practice to remain competitive and avoid bankruptcy. Thus, the black economy 
is not a cultural phenomenon, but a judicial one.  
We argue that practice of unregistered transactions has a significant effect on the 
governance of corporations. Often overlooked cost of this practice comes through lost 
transparency. Obviously, transparency and unregistered transactions are incompatible as 
such transactions can not be reported. What is not reported is directly controlled by the 
majority owner; minority shareholders’ claim is only on the reported earnings. As a 
result, these companies are significantly undervalued in the market, or alternatively, 
control premium will be too high. Essentially these companies cannot access to equity 
capital at reasonable prices, thereby curtailing growth opportunities through new 
investments. 
Less obviously, loss of transparency also affects efficiency of management at companies. 
First, providing incentives to managers is problematic. Because of incomplete reporting, 
formal and enforceable performance-based contracts can not be executed with top 
management. Performance-based rewards can only be paid informally. As the economic 
principles dictate, absence of incentive mechanisms leads to excessive monitoring. 
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Typically, Turkish companies are run by owners and very little power is delegated to 
managers. 
Secondly, owners and managers can become enmeshed in the illegality of unrecorded 
transactions, making firing managers difficult. Under these circumstances, the primary 
attribute the owner looks for in a manager is trustworthiness, rather than management 
acumen. Combination of these factors diminishes the managerial effectiveness when 
transparency is lost. In his key note speech on the 24 of 2004 at Sabanci University’s 
Family Firms and Corporate Governance Conference, Mr. Eczacibasi explained the 
situation with the following words; “Lack of trust in the legal process and in the validity 
of contracts strengthens the inclination not to trust anyone but family members….The 
strong personality of the founders can create very strong corporate cultures.”  
f. Effects of Excessive Control of Managers 
On one hand, direct control of managers is beneficial as it removes the agency problem 
between owners and managers, which is especially important in Anglo-Saxon countries. 
On the other hand, however, it may lead to loss of efficiency and lower growth for the 
following reasons.  
• Majority owners of large firms and business groups need to oversee operations of 
several companies at any given time. Time sharing of executive power of owners 
can be thought of as companies being run by part-time CEOs. This is clearly 
ineffective, limiting growth potential of individual firms. 
• Majority owners, especially first-generation of the family, are founders with 
entrepreneurial talents. When they cannot transfer executive power to 
professionals, their entrepreneurial activities suffer, as they have to spend their 
time controlling the professionals. 
• Furthermore, successive generations in a family may lack managerial talents. 
Oversight by such family members may lead to direct loss of efficiency. 
• Need for direct control in firms also inhibits diversification of owners’ portfolios 
through financial investments. Consequently, majority owners remain too risk 
averse for efficient investment policies. In particular, they may be unwilling to 
take high-risk, high-return investments opportunities, hurting innovativeness of 
firms. 
VI. Key Recommendations 
Recently, OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance has drafted a report on 
corporate governance of Turkey as a pilot study. This report provides a detailed analysis 
of institutional framework vis a vis OECD guidelines, including some recommendations 
and policy options. The recommendations in this report can be summarized as follows:55
• Improving the potential for market disciplinary forces 
o Increase free float requirements 
o Amend the pension and mutual fund laws 
o Investor education initiatives 
o Amend tender offer laws 
                                                 
55 This discussion is based on the draft report dated March 2006, which is not publicly circulated.  
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• Improved transparency 
o Enhance disclosure standards in key areas 
o Centralization of financial standard-setting process 
o Adopt international standards for auditing 
• Improve effectiveness of regulating bodies 
o Provide more independence and penal powers to CMB 
o Adopt a risk based approach to regulation 
o Improve coordination of regulating bodies 
• Improve legal protection and access to remedies 
 
The report provides a detailed discussion of these recommendations. Rather than 
repeating the same analysis in an effort to be comprehensive, our strategy is to build on 
these recommendations. Still some of the recommendations are repeated below either for 
emphasis or for pointing out additional aspects. More importantly, however, we try to 
expand the perspective of sought out improvements. Given that the report is based on 
OECD guidelines, the focus of the recommendations is, naturally, minority shareholder 
protection. While this is certainly an important target, it is our opinion that managerial 
effectiveness of the firms should also be addressed. 
a. Free Float Requirements 
As suggested in the OECD report, we would also strongly recommend increasing free 
float requirements from 5-25% to at least 20-30% depending on company value. 
However, we would also like to point out that certain steps need to be taken to ensure that 
float ratio do not decrease over time. As already reported, there are small cap firms 
trading in ISE with less than 10% (even 1%) float ratios. There are two main mechanisms 
that reduce free float ratio: 
1. Mergers: When a public merges with a private firm, float ratio is automatically 
reduced. In practice, these mergers occur as a transaction between majority owners of 
both companies and owners of public shares have no voice over the transaction as general 
assemblies are also dominated by the majority owners. Effectively, fairness of these 
transactions can only be enforced by CMB, which would be weak due to informational 
asymmetry. To this end, OECD report suggests amending tender offer laws to ensure that 
minority shareholders are treated fairly. However, this does not address reduced flotation 
rate of the merged company unless the company is de-listed in the process. We 
recommend that some level of flotation requirement is enforced through mandated 
secondary issues following significant mergers. 
2. High Priced Rights Issues: It is observed some companies undertake a rights issue 
with a price that exceeds market price of the shares, particularly when share price falls 
below the nominal value of the shares. From a financial point of view, holders of shares 
should not subscribe to these rights issues, as the issued right has an effectively negative 
value. Consequently, such rights issues are only subscribed by majority shareholders, 
increasing their ownership of the company, and reducing flotation ratio. Clearly, this 
should be avoided through regulation. 
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b. CG Index 
CMB and ISE jointly initiated a CG Index project in 2004 to provide an incentive to firms 
to improve their corporate governance. According to this scheme, firms that receive 
corporate governance rating of higher than 6 are included in this index with reduced 
listing fees. As of May 2006, this index did not become operational as firms did not show 
much interest, and the number of firms that received a rating is less than 5, which is the 
minimum number required for commencing the index. 
While creating a corporate governance index is a commendable goal, we view the 
implementation as deficient. The only requirement for being included in this index is a 
CG rating of 6. This rating is provided by commercial rating agencies, which are 
registered at the CMB, using their own methodology and weighing criteria (except the 
respective weighing of 4 main areas which are specified by the CMB). The rating is a 
“compliance” rating against the CMB’s Guidelines according to the relevant 
communiqué, not a rating of the “quality of the corporate governance regime” of the firm. 
The methodologies are proprietary to the rating agencies and cannot be audited. It follows 
that ratings given by different agencies are not necessarily comparable. This 
implementation strategy therefore carries the danger that less-scrupulous rating agencies 
may dominate the rating market by giving exaggerated ratings. This may even result in 
reputable rating agencies leaving the Turkish market entirely. Even without going to this 
extreme, the variation in the CG quality of the companies in the index will certainly 
reduce the credibility of the scheme, and the index may not show the performance hoped 
for.56
We recommend that the basic requirement for inclusion in the index should be 
compliance assessment, rather than a rating. Compliance should be assessed against a set 
of requirements, which are based on CMB’s guidelines selected for having critical 
importance and being measurable to reasonable degree. Other objective criteria such as a 
certain minimum floatation rate and wedge (deviation between cash flow rights and 
control rights) should be considered for inclusion in the index as is the case for 
BOVESPA. At this point as determining actual set of requirements requires careful 
analysis and research. However, an initiative to undertake this analysis should be started 
before index becomes operational. STAR and BOVESPA experiences should be closely 
examined with respect to suitability for Turkey.  
c. Independent Board Members 
It is interesting to note that OECD report lacks any recommendation related to 
independent board members, an issue that received wide interest elsewhere. There may be 
two reasons for exclusion; (i) it is already covered by CMB guidelines, although without 
any practical effect, and (ii) independence of board members usually remain a theoretical 
exercise, as members chosen by majority shareholders have little incentive to voice 
independent opinions for protection of minority shareholders. 
Still, we believe that the issue of independent board members should remain as a focus. 
While this is admittedly easy to regulate but impossible to enforce, we believe that it will 
have a positive effect thorough its affect on corporate culture, hopefully pushing towards 
                                                 
56 Other concerns that may effect the credibility of the index are: (i) compliance aspect of the rating requires an 
auditing competence in addition to rating competence (ii) the rating agencies operating in Turkey have limited 
experience and coverage in emerging markets, raising concerns about the reliability of their methodology. 
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more formal means of governance. Furthermore, a few success stories and attention to 
good practices may increase the effectiveness of independent board members in the long 
term. 
However, there is a strong impediment for election of independent board members due to 
legal framework for nomination of board members. Currently, the power of nominating 
board members is given only to shareholders as an inalienable right. This corresponds to 
the prevalent view of board members as representatives of shareholder groups. Even the 
draft CC follows this view, effectively ignoring the basis that board members should only 
consider the good of the company, not just the benefits of a group of shareholders. In 
practice, many companies have detailed stipulations in their AoA regarding the number of 
board members nominated by different share groups. While CMB’s guidelines call for a 
CG committee which should nominate board members, these conflicts with CC. Current 
practice of share groups with nomination rights and other blocking rights are detrimental 
to effective management of companies as it increases the risk of dead locks.57
Within this framework, an independent board member can only be nominated by a share 
group within their quota of board members, which essentially defeats the independence 
concept. We strongly recommend that the law should be amended in this matter, allowing 
at least independent members to be nominated by the board of directors, or a committee 
charged with this task. 
d. Group Firms 
Draft CC brings extensive disclosure requirements for firms within a business group, or in 
a parent-subsidiary relationship. At the same time, the code recognizes a certain power of 
parent firms over subsidiaries. There is certainly a philosophical problem as this view 
conflicts with independent legal existence of subsidiary firms. However, this becomes a 
practical CG concern when the subsidiary is a public company itself. 
A public company should be an independent entity seeking its own benefit, and should be 
free from exertion of undue power by any shareholder, including the parent company 
unless the company law recognizes the “groups” as a special case as in German law. This 
issue does not receive proper attention in CMB’s CG guidelines or in disclosure 
requirements, and should be amended. The following should be considered a minimum 
set of requirements for tackling this problem beyond the normal requirements of related 
party transactions when the subsidiary is a public company: 
• Parent and subsidiary should not have the same person as board members with 
executive powers, including designated board members (murahhas aza). Non-
executive members who are employees/officers of the parent should be disclosed 
and clearly designated as such. 
• The Articles of Association of the subsidiary should clearly state the scope of 
“dependence” to the parent. Prospectuses issued at the time of IPO should also 
explain the nature of the “control” agreement with the parent. Furthermore any 
Holding company who wishes to have listed subsidiaries should explain their 
“added value” and “control powers” they wish to use in their Articles of 
Association.  
                                                 
57 Case of Turkcell. 
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• Parent company’s internal audit units should not be allowed to audit the listed 
subsidiary unless the results of the audit with respect to risks are shared with the 
public and the staff involved in the audit is included in the list of “insiders”. 
• Transfer of a top executive between a parent and a subsidiary company should be 
considered as an event that requires disclosure, similar to related party 
transactions 
e. Transparency and Disclosure 
We wish to add the following disclosure requirements to the recommendations in the 
OECD report for improved transparency. 
• Disclosure of ultimate beneficiaries should be enforced. This information is very 
difficult, or impossible, to obtain independently as Turkey does not have central 
register for joint stock companies. 
o It would be desirable to establish a central register where ownership and 
financial statements for all joint stock companies becomes public 
information. 
• The concept of “Public Interest Entity” should be introduced and all companies 
above a certain size and of public interest should have the same disclosure 
obligations as publicly owned companies. 
• Disclosure of Articles of Association should be mandatory as it is the main 
governing document of a joint stock company. 
Furthermore we strongly recommend that the experience and know how of the big 
international audit firms and TIDE58 should be used by the regulators.  Currently  
practical experience in IFRS and IAS are found only within these organizations.   
f. Legal Framework 
New draft laws introduce a progressive and comprehensive framework for the corporate 
governance regime in Turkey. It is our hope that these laws will enacted without delays, 
and measures will be taken to implement them effectively. Yet, enforcement remains a 
critical area for the overall success of the system. We advocate wholeheartedly the 
recommendations included in the OECD report for provision of more affordable, 
accessible and predictable remedies and other enforcement mechanisms. 
VII. Areas for Further Research 
Currently there are many reports and papers describing the state of corporate governance 
in Turkey. Yet, our understanding of efficiency implications of governance remains 
limited and does not go beyond deductive reasoning. We feel that further research is 
required to pinpoint the specific governance with significant effect on efficiency and 
growth. This is particularly important, for example, for developing the set of requirements 
for inclusion in the CG index as discussed above. There is an upsurge of excellent 
finance-law papers and the focus of CG research is shifting to controlling shareholders.59 
                                                 
58 See Figure 5. 
59 R. Gilson, B.  Black, Morck and Yeung , Dick and Zingales , P. Bolton, etc 
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Emerging theoretical models will provide the necessary framework for empirical studies 
at micro level to support policy making process.      
In particular, there is a need for qualitative research to understand drivers of companies, 
such as, 
• The changing role of business groups and holding companies 
• Instruments for expropriation and entrenchment  
• The role and value of non-pecuniary private benefits   
• Industry/sector specific implications of controlling shareholders systems 
• Dynamics of efficient controlling shareholder systems  
• Better understanding of board and management practices in business groups 
• Perceived reasons for resistance to adopting formal control systems rather than 
informal direct control 
• Utilization or non-utilization of performance based contracting for top executives 
• Incentives for improved transparency and better governance  
• Level of trust in the judicial system 
 
The qualitative research should in turn lead to empirical tests of CG variables found to be 
significant drivers of growth and firm value. Furthermore, this research would indicate 
whether other governance structures, such as two-tier boards, formalizing the separation 
of execution and control would be suitable for Turkish companies. 
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Annex 
Comparison of international best practices and Commercial Code CC), 
Capital Market Law (CML), Capital Market Communiqués (CMC) and CMB 
Principles  
(compiled from IIF report on Turkey (2005) and CMB Web-Site) 
 
MANDATORY   
Commercial Code (CC), Capital Market Law 
(CML), and Capital Market Communiqués 
(CMC) 
Topic International Standards (IIF) 
COMPLY OR EXPLAIN 
Capital Markets Board Corporate Governance 
Principles (CMB Principles) 
Minority Shareholder Protection 
Voting rights 
Proxy voting allowed (CC Art. 360, details on 
execution outlined in CMC Ser. IV, No. 8, Art 4 
et. Seq.).  2003 
Proxy voting 
 
Firms are encouraged to allow proxy voting. 
Provisions restricting proxy voting should not be 
included in the company’s articles of association 
(CMB Principles Sec. I Art. 4.6). 2003 
May have multiple voting and non-voting shares. One share one vote 
principle 
    
“One share one vote” should be a threshold 
requirement for new issues.  
Privileges regarding voting rights should be 
avoided (CMB Principles Sec. I Art. 4.5). 2003  
Optional. Cumulative voting 
 
Cumulative voting should be permitted. 
Cumulative voting should be adopted (CMB 
Principles Sec. I Art. 5, Sec. IV Art. 3.4). 2003 
Capital structure 
Procedures on major 
corporate    changes 
 
Shareholder approval of mergers and major 
asset transactions should be required.   
 
If an offer is made above a reasonable 
minimum threshold of outstanding stock, a 
significant portion of that purchase must be 
through a public offer.   
 
Ownership exceeding 35% triggers a public 
offer in which all shareholders are treated 
equally.  
 
Under a merger or takeover, minority 
shareholders should have a legal right to sell 
shares at appraised value. 
Mergers require a change in company articles of 
association, which requires shareholder approval 
(CC Art. 388).  1959 
 
A tender offer for remaining shares is required 
when a shareholder’s interest crosses  25%, or if 
initially between 25% and 50% increases by 10% 
or more, of voting stock within any given 12-
month period or if there is change of 
management’s control regardless of percentage of 
shares held.  Price offered may not be less than 
price offered to target shares.  CMB may grant 
exceptions in certain limited cases (CMC Ser. IV, 
No. 8, Art. 14 et seq.). 2003 
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Procedures on major 
corporate    changes 
(continued) 
Shareholder approval of major decisions, including 
divisions and sale, purchase, pledge, or lease of 
significant assets, should be required (CMB 
Principles Sec. I Art. 3.6).  The information about 
tender offer should be disclosed immediately 
(CMB Principles Sec. II Art. 1.11.5, 6) 2003 
Capital increase (pre-
emptive rights)   
 
Shareholders approval is required.  Any 
capital increase over a period of 1 year and 
above a minimum threshold must first be 
offered to all existing shareholders. 
In a capital increase, shareholders are generally 
entitled to subscribe for new shares in proportion 
to their respective shareholdings. Pre-emption 
rights of the shareholders may be restricted wholly 
or in part by an affirmative vote of the holders of a 
majority of the outstanding share capital at a 
shareholders meeting (CC Art. 388).  For 
companies that have adopted the authorized capital 
system (most listed companies) this authority may 
be conferred upon the board, which is required to 
apply such restrictions equally with respect to all 
shareholders (CML Art. 12).  The power to restrict 
the rights of shareholders obtaining new shares 
may not be used in a way causing inequalities 
among the shareholders (CML Art. 12). 1959 and 
1992 
 
Share buybacks Details of share buybacks should be fully 
disclosed to shareholders. 
Not permitted, save for certain limited exceptions 
(CC Art. 329). 1959 
Shareholder meeting 
Notice and relevant documents should be given to 
shareholders at least 15 days in advance of all 
shareholder meetings (CC Art. 368). 1959 
Meeting notice and 
agenda 
Meeting notice and agenda should be sent to 
shareholders within a reasonable amount of 
time prior to meetings. 
Extensive details on notice and agenda listed 
(CMB Principles Sec. I Art. 3). 2003 
Special meetings Minority shareholders should be able to call 
special meetings with some minimum 
threshold of the outstanding shares. 
Shareholders holding at least 5% of share capital 
can call special meeting (CC Art. 366, CML Art. 
11).  1959 and 1992 
Treatment of foreign 
shareholders 
Foreign shareholders should be treated equally 
with domestic shareholders. 
All shareholders, including minority and foreign 
shareholders, should be treated equally (CMB 
Principles Sec. I Art. 8.1). 2003 
5% of share capital may ask a shareholders’ 
meeting to appoint a special auditor to examine 
alleged abuses.  If shareholders’ meeting violates 
rules, shareholders may directly petition court for 
appointment of a special auditor (CC Arts. 348, 
356, 367, 381 et seq., CML Art. 12). 1959 1992 
Conflicts between 
shareholders 
Should have mechanisms whereby a minority 
shareholder can trigger an arbitration 
procedure to resolve conflicts between 
minority and controlling shareholders 
The board, corporate governance committee, and 
an investor relations department should facilitate 
the exercise of shareholder rights, including 
protecting minority shareholders (CMB Principles 
Sec. I Art. 1, Sec. IV Art. 1.5). 2003 
Quorum Should not be set too high or too low.  
Suggested level would be about 30% and 
should include some independent non-
majority-owning shareholders.  
In general, quorum is 25% of share capital, with 
no quorum for adjourned meeting.  For amending 
articles, 50% with 33% (1/3) for adjourned 
meeting (CC Arts. 372, 388).1959 
 
Structure and Responsibilities of the Board of Directors 
Board structure 
Definition of independence  Cannot have a business or personal No provision. 
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relationship with the management or 
company, and cannot be a controlling 
shareholder such that independence, or 
appearance of independence, is jeopardized.  
7 criteria for independent directors, including 
not having any direct/indirect relationship 
with the company, not holding more than 5% 
of total share capital, not having been 
previously elected to represent special 
shareholder group, not having served on 
board for more than 7 years, not have been 
employed by external auditor (CMB 
Principles Sec. IV Art. 3.3.5).  2003 
No Provision Share of independent directors At least one-third of the board should be 
non-executive, a majority of who should be 
independent. 
Majority of the board should be non-
executive.  At least one-third should be 
independent, with a minimum of 2 (CMB 
Principles Sec. IV Arts. 3.2.1; 3.3.1). The 
board chairman and chief executive officer is 
not the same person and that majority of the 
board should consist of non-executive 
members (CMB Principles Sec. IV Art. 
3.2.1). 2003 
No Provision Frequency and record of 
meetings 
For large companies, board meetings every 
quarter, audit committee meetings every 6 
months.  Minutes of meetings should 
become part of public record. 
Board should meet at least once a month.  
Decisions of the board should be recorded in 
the minute book (CMB Principles Sec. IV 
Arts. 2.16.2; 2.17.5; 2.19.1). 2003 
The meeting quorum of a Board of Directors 
under Turkish law is constituted by the 
presence of half plus one more of directors 
of a joint stock company.  The decision 
quorum is the majority of the board members 
present in a meeting (CC Art. 330). 1959 
Quorum Should consist of executive, non-executive, 
and independent non-executive members. 
Quorum should be included in the articles 
(CMB Principles Section IV Art. 2.18). 2003 
Shareholders of at least 10% of share capital 
may put forward a nominee for the board at 
AGM or SGM (CC Art. 366).  1959 
Nomination of directors Should be done by nomination committee 
chaired by an independent director. Minority 
shareholders should have mechanism for 
putting forward directors at Annual General 
Meeting (AGM) and Extraordinary General 
Meeting (EGM). 
Board should have a corporate governance 
committee that nominates directors chaired 
by independent director with majority of 
independent directors (CMB Principles Sec. 
IV Arts 5.2, 5.3. 5.7). 2003 
Board must have a minimum of 3 directors 
elected for a maximum term of 3 years (CC 
Arts. 312, 314). 1959  
Term limits for directors For large companies, re-election should be 
every 3 years with specified term limits. 
Independent members cannot serve for 7 
years or more (CMB Principles Sec. IV Art. 
3.3.4). 2003 
Audit committee consisting of a minimum of 
2 non-executive directors supervises 
company auditing (CMC Ser. X, No. 16 Art. 
28/A). 2003 
Board committees The Board should set up 3 essential 
committees: nomination, compensation and 
audit.  
Should have audit committee chaired by an 
independent director with a majority of non-
executive directors and a corporate 
governance (which covers issues of 
nomination and compensation) committee 
with a majority of independent directors 
(CMB Principles Sec. IV Arts. 5.2, 5.3, 5.6, 
5.7).07/2003 
Disclosure 
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Public discloser should be made of a wide 
variety of events including 
acquisition/disposal of assets, board changes, 
related party deals, ownership changes, 
directors’ shareholdings, etc.  (CMC Ser. 
VIII, No. 39). 20/07/2003 
Disclosure of information that 
affects share prices  
Any material information that could affect 
share prices should be disclosed through 
stock exchange.  Material information 
includes acquisition/disposal of assets, board 
changes, related party deals, ownership 
changes, directors’ shareholdings, etc. 
Any developments that affect value of the 
company’s capital market instruments should 
be disclosed to the public without delay.  In 
addition to legally required disclosure, 
company should disclose any information 
that may affect decisions of shareholders and 
investors (CMB Principles Sec. II Arts. 1.3; 
1.12). 2003 
Information to be released through the 
exchange and, if deemed necessary by the 
Exchange board, through media or electronic 
means (CMC Ser. VIII, No. 39, Art. 16). 
2003 
Procedures for information 
release 
Through local exchanges and as best 
practice, through company website. 
Company’s website should be actively used 
as a means of public disclosure (CMB 
Principles Sec. II Art. 1.11). 2003 
All compensation of directors is determined 
in the articles of association or at the annual 
meeting (CC Arts. 333, 369). 1959 
Remuneration of directors  Should be disclosed in annual report.  All 
major compensation schemes, including 
stock options, should be fully disclosed and 
subject to shareholder approval. Remuneration of directors, including share 
options, should be disclosed in annual report 
(CMB Principles II Art. 3.2.2).  2003 
Other responsibilities 
Director must inform the board of any 
conflicts of interest and may not participate 
in deliberations on the matter.  They may not 
without permission from shareholders enter 
into business relations with the company 
either directly or indirectly unless permitted 
by the general assembly (CC Arts. 332, 334, 
335). 1959 
Conflict of interest Any potential or actual conflicts of interest 
on the part of directors should be disclosed.  
Board members should abstain from voting 
if they have a conflict of interest pertaining 
to that matter. 
Board members not permitted to attend the 
board meeting that may concern his/her 
interests (CMB Principles Sec. IV Art. 2.20) 
2003   
Audit committee is required to supervise 
management and effectiveness of the internal 
control system (CMC Ser. X No. 16 Art. 
28/A) 2003 
Internal control and risk 
management system 
Should be a function of the audit committee. 
Board should establish internal control and 
risk management mechanisms. Audit 
committee should supervise the execution of 
the company’s internal control system (CMB 
Principles Sec. IV Art. 1.3.2; 5.6.4). 2003 
 
 
No provision. Investor Relations Should have an investor relations program 
Extensive provisions for investor relations 
department associated with chair of 
corporate governance committee (CMB 
Principles Sec. I Art. 1.1). 2003 
Social responsibility and ethics Make a statement of policy concerning No provision. 
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environmental issues and social 
responsibility. 
Ethical rules should be prepared by board, 
disclosed to the public, and information on 
such rules provided to general assembly.  
Company should be considerate of its social 
responsibility (environment, public health, 
consumer protection, etc) and act in 
accordance with its ethical rules (CMB 
Principles Sec. III Art. 6; 7). 2003 
Accounting/Auditing 
Standards 
    National/international GAAP Identify accounting standard used. Comply 
with local practices and use consolidated 
accounting (annually) for all subsidiaries in 
which sizable ownership exists. 
IFRS must be used with inflation adjustment 
(CMC Ser. XI No. 20 Art. 9; Ser. XI No. 25 
Arts. 378 et. seq.).2004 
    Frequency Semi-annually audited report at end-FY. Companies should present financial 
statements to CMB and exchange on a 
quarterly basis.  They should also have their 
end-year and mid-year financial results 
audited by external auditors (CMC Ser. XI 
No. 1 Arts. 48, 49; Ser. XI No. 3 Art. 10). 
2003 
Companies must be independently 
audited by auditors certified by CMB.  
Auditors are liable for civil sanctions if 
they mislead investors ((CML Art. 16/4) 
(CMC Ser. X No. 16 Arts. 32, 45).  
2003 
Audit firm may only be appointed for a 
maximum period of 5 years (CMC Ser. X 
No. 16 Art. 24) 2003 
    Audit quality Independent public accountant.  As a best 
practice, auditors should adhere to the global 
standards devised by the International 
Forum on Accountancy Development 
(IFAD). 
Audit firm must be independent and 
subject to regular rotation a maximum 
period of 5 years (CMB Principles Sec.  
II Art. 4.1-2). 2003 
Audit committee 
Audit committee consisting of a minimum of 
2 non-executive directors to supervise 
company auditing is required (CMC Ser. X 
No. 16 Art. 28/A). 2003 
Audit committee For large firms, must be chaired by qualified 
independent director with a financial 
background 
Audit committee should be chaired by an 
independent board member and the majority 
of members should be non-executive. All 
board members should be capable of 
analyzing and interpreting financial 
statements and reports (CMB Principles Sec. 
IV Arts. 3.1.5, 5.2, 5.3).  2003 
Relationship/communication 
with internal and external 
auditors 
Committee should approve services 
provided by external auditor.  Breakdown of 
proportion of fees paid for each service 
should be made available in annual report.  
Audit committee supervises appointment, 
services and any work by independent 
auditors (CMC Ser. X No. 16 Art. 28/A). 
2003 
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Relationship/communication 
with internal and external 
auditors (continued) 
Communication with auditors should be 
without executives present.  
Contemporaneous provision of audit and 
non-audit services from the same entity 
should be prohibited. 
Audit committee should supervise external 
auditor of the company.  Appointment and 
activities of the external audit firm should be 
under the surveillance of an audit committee. 
Audit committee should be able to invite 
executives, internal and external auditors to 
its meetings.  Audit firms are not permitted 
to provide consultancy services to the 
company to which they provide external 
auditing services within the same period 
(CMB Principles Sec. II Art. 4.3.1; Sec. IV 
Arts. 5.6.1; 5.6.3; 5.6.4; 5.6.5). 2003 
Transparency of Ownership and Control  
Buyout offer to minority 
shareholders 
Ownership exceeding 35% triggers a buyout 
offer in which all shareholders are treated 
equally. 
See section on procedures on major 
corporate changes above. 
Detailed information about related party 
transactions should be included in the 
company’s financial statement (CMC Ser. 
VIII, No. 39). 2003 
 
Insider trading is punishable by 
administrative and penal sanctions 
(CML Art. 47).  1992 
 
“Disguised profit transfers” among related 
parties are subject to administrative and 
penal sanctions (CML Arts. 15/7, 46, 47/A). 
1992   
Related-party ownership Companies should disclose directors’ and 
senior executives’ shareholdings 
 
All insider dealings by directors and senior 
executives should be disclosed. 
Board members, executives, and 
shareholders who own directly or indirectly 
5% of the company’s capital should disclose 
all company capital market instrument 
transactions (CMB Principles Sec. II 
Art.2.3).  2003 
 
To prevent insider trading, a list of the 
names of executives and other persons who 
can potentially possess price-sensitive 
information should be disclosed to the public 
(CMB Principles Sec. II Art. 5.2).  2003 
Minimally significant 
Shareholders 
Shareholders with minimally significant 
ownership (greater than 3-10%) of 
outstanding shares must disclose their 
holdings 
Changes in direct or indirect ownership of 
5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25% 33⅓ %, 50%, 
66⅔%, 75% or more of total voting rights or 
capital must be disclosed (CMC Ser. VIII, 
No. 39, Art. 5). 2003 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. 20 year history of Istanbul Stock Exchange. ISE100 index in US$ is shown as 
average of beginning and ending index values, bars show average daily trading volume.  
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Figure 2: Growth of Pension Funds 
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Figure 3. Distribution of flotation ratios of public corporations 
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Figure 4.  IPOs and value of issued equity at ISE 
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Figure 5. Distribution of certified internal audit professionals  
 
 
Certification 
Number of Certified Professionals 
and their employers 
CIA 131 ( 46 Banks, 15 government,  
rest are holdings  and big 4 auditors) 
CFSA 9 (Banks) 
CCSA 8 (Banks) 
  Source: Own compilation from TIDE’s records 
 
Figure 6. Net equity flows to corporations at ISE 
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